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FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
REVISION 6: ARTiCLE IX, § 1, PUBLIC
EDUCATION OF CHILDREN
Summary: Declares the education of children to be a fundamental value of
the people of Florida; establishes adequate provision for education as a
paramount duty of the state; expands constitutional mandate requiring the
state to make adequate provision for a uniform system of free public
schools by also requiring the state to make adequate provision for an
efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system.
Full text of the amendment:
ARTICLE IX
EDUCATION
SECTION 1. System o Public education.-The education of
children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of
Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make
adequate provision for the education of all children residing
within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law
for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system
of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high
quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of institutions of higher learning and other public
education programs that the needs of the people may require.l
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of education in our society is axiomatic. Thomas
Jefferson once noted, "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free.., it
expects what never was and never will be."2 From the earliest days of the
1. FLORIDA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, J. OF THE 1997-98 CONST. REVISION
COMM'N, May 5, 1998, at 251 [hereinafter CRC JOURNAL]. The 1998 proposed constitutional
revisions are available on the internet both at the Constitution Revision Commission's Web site,
<http://law.fsu.edu/crc> and at the Florida Dept. of State, Division of Elections Web site,
<http:llelection.dos.state.fl.usl1998EleclAmendments/Index.html>.
2. Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,409
(Fla. 1996) (Overton, J., concurring) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Charles
Yancy (Jan. 6, 1816)). Another apposite quote comes from James Madison, who wrote:
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own
governors must arm themselves with the power that knowledge gives .... Learned
institutions ought to be favorite objects with every free people. They throw that
light over the public mind which is the best security against crafty and dangerous
encroachments on the public liberty.
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republic, public education has been considered part of the basic contract
between government and citizens.3 Among the nine revisions proposed to
Florida voters by the Constitution Revision Commission in 1998, Revision
6 fundamentally enhanced Florida's responsibility for public education.4
Revision 6 amended Article IX, Section 1, of the Florida Constitution,
which sets forth the State's duty to provide for public education. Entitled
"PUBLIC EDUCATION OF CHILDREN," Revision 6 makes a
declaration of the relative importance of education to the people of Florida,
and describes as "paramount" the duty of the state to adequately provide
for education.5 Revision 6 goes on to detail and raise the constitutional
standard for what constitutes "adequate provision" for public education,
and obliges the state to deliver a high quality education to its children.6
This Article will attempt to place Florida's recent education
amendment into context, briefly examining both the development of
education finance litigation in Florida and the recent waves of education
finance litigation nationwide.7 By successfully revising its constitutional
language, Florida has uniquely modified the ongoing discussion about the
adequacy of state support for education. By providing specific standards
for adequacy, the Constitution Revision Commission has invited greater
court supervision of the Legislature's role in education funding and has
guaranteed that future litigation will determine whether the state currently
meets its duty to make "adequate provision" for public education.'
Ironically, both proponents and opponents argued that the change will
provide a standard for litigation. The Constitution Revision Commission's
clear goal was to increase the state's constitutional duty and raise the
constitutional standard for adequate education, and in fact to make the
standard high quality. It remains to be seen how the challenge of providing
a sound basic education for Florida's children will be met.
Id. (quoting James Madison).
3. See, e.g., William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School Finance, 35
B.C. L. REV. 569, 570-78 (1994) (exploring the history and development of state provision for
public education).
4. Revision 6 was approved by 71% of Florida voters in the 1998 general election. See, e.g.,
Jeff Kunerth, Revision Defeat Sparks Recount, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1998, at Dl. Only the
environmental proposal (Revision 5) and the local gun-control option proposal (Revision 12)
received a greater percentage of the vote. See Florida Constitution Revision Commission (visited
Jan. 26, 2000) <http//Ilaw.fsu.edulcrc> (giving 1998 election results) [hereinafter CRC].
5. CRC JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 251.
6. Id.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 23-55 (discussing waves ofeducation finance litigation
in other states).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 258-66 (discussing the first education finance lawsuit
following passage of Revision 6).
2.000]
II. EDUCATION IN CRISIS
Among principal national concerns in the waning years of the
twentieth century, Americans have increasingly focused on the quality of
their education systems.9 Numerous articles have raised concerns about
high school graduates unable to read their diplomas, or the prospect of
American students increasingly falling behind their contemporaries in
other countries.'" Public officials, whether national, state or local, have
responded to these concerns, pledging new resources and promising new
programs intended to improve public education." Inevitably, while debate
9. Such concerns were heightened in 1983. See NATIONALCOMMISSIONON EXCELLENCEIN
EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983) (arguing that the
nation's mediocre education system posed a long-term risk to the national interest). See generally
JONATHANKOZOL, SAVAGEINEQUALTIES: CHILDRENIN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991) (detailing the
disparities in opportunities provided by wealthy and poor schools).
10. In Florida, for example, graduation rates declined from 78.7% in 1992-93 to 73.2% in
1996-97. See 1998 FLORIDA STATISTICALABSTRACT 131 (32d ed. 1998).
The Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) evaluated the mathematics
and science performance of 4th, 8th and 12th graders from 41 countries. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, HIGHLI.HTS FROM TIMSS: OVERVIEW AND KEY FINDINGS ACROSS GRADE
LEVELS 11 (NCES 1999-081, 1999). This testing showed that American 4th graders scored above
average in both science and mathematics, measured against their peers in other countries, but that
they slipped below average in math by 8th grade, and remained below average in both subjects at
12th grade. See id. at 11-12.
11. Federal politicians have veered between proposing the abolition of the Department of
Education as wasteful, the reduction of "burdensome" federal mandates, and the promise of
additional federal funding to place 100,000 teachers in schools and to improve facilities. See, e.g.,
Marianne Means, Parties Argue Over 'Solutions' While Schools Falter, SuN-SENTINEL, Apr. 23,
1998, at 21A; Paul Barton, Officials Warm to Education Efforts; Clinton's Proposal Draws Some
Caution, CINCiNNATIENQUIRER, Mar. 14,1999, at A09; James Sterngold, Bush WouldDeny Money
to Schools Judged as Failing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A14; William Booth, Bush Proposes
Giving School Funds to Parents; Opponents of Vouchers Criticize Idea, WASH. POST, Sept. 3,
1999, at A01. Over the past twenty-five years, public schools have received an increasing amount
of federal funds (federal funds averaged some 6.6% of funds spent nationally on public elementary
and secondary schools, and some 7.4% of funds spent in Floridain 1995-96). See NATIONALCTR.
FOR EDUC. STAT., 1998 DIG. OFEDUC. STAT. 170 (NCES 1999-036, 1999) [hereinafter 1998 DIG.
OF EDUC. STAT.]. With that increase in federal funding, there has been a parallel expansion in
federal mandates and rules applicable to local schools. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 400; see also Education at a Crossroads: What Works and
What's Wasted in Education TodayBefore Subcomr. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-21 (1998) [hereinafter Educ. at a
Crossroads] (providing a list of federal education-related programs and mandates). Describing the
burden of federal mandates, then Florida Education Commissioner Brogan stated that, while 374
people in the state Department of Education administer $8 billion in state funds, 297 employees are
required to oversee $1 billion in federal funds, six times as many administrative employees per
dollar received. See Hearings on the "Dollars to the Classroom Act, " H.R. 3248 Before the House
Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) (statement of Frank Brogan,
Florida Educ. Commissioner); Educ. at a Crossroads, supra at 16.
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continues around issues of standards 2 and substantive programs, much of
the argument-and litigation-revolves around education finance.13 In
Florida, high population growth has made the provision of a sound, basic
education evermore difficult and expensive as districts struggle to fit more
children into already crowded schools. 4 Florida has larger classes than
most other states in the nation.'" What is more, these larger classes are in
On a state level, lawmakers have sought to draft and apply higher standards and more rigorous
testing and to provide funds for improved facilities'. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 229.565 (as amended
by 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-398, § 6) (providing for performance standards in key subject areas) &
232.246 (Supp. 1998) (setting out requirements for high school graduation); cf. Tamar Lewin,
Schools Taking Tougher Stance with Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1999, at Al. Other, more
controversial programs include charter schools and vouchers to allow parents to choose where to
educate their children by making private education more affordable for poorer families. See, e.g.,
1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-398 (providing for the grading of individual schools, and offering vouchers
to students from failing schools); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1999) (voucher program). See
generally Patricia Wohlstetter, Education by Charter, in SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMENT:
ORGANIZING FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE 139-64 (Susan A. Mohrman et al., eds., 1994); Timothy D.
Lynch, Note, Education asa Fundamental Right: Challenging the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence,
26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953,987-90 (1998) (discussing alternative education programs); Christopher
D. Pixley, The Next Frontier in Public School Finance Reform: A Policy and Constitutional
Analysis of School Choice Legislation, 24 J. LEGIs. 21, 25-40 (1998); Sorting Out School Choice,
THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 1999, at 33.
On the parental level, there is a growing desire for school choice, as demonstrated by the
success of the Cleveland and Wisconsin voucher programs, as well as private school scholarships
in places like New York. For example, in 1995, some 69% of those polled by Gallup favored
allowing open school choice among all public schools in a community, and by 1997, some 44% in
a similar Gallup poll favored allowing parents to choose to send their children to private schools
even at public expense. See 1998 DIG. OFEDUC. STAT., supra note 11, at 30. Likewise, a steadily
increasing number of parents are turning to private education even without vouchers, or are
choosing to educate their children at home. In Florida, in 1997-98, over ten percent of K-12
students, or more than 270,000 students, were educated in private schools. See 1998 FLORIDA
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 10, at 118. In addition, nearly 26,000 Florida students from
over 17,000 families, were home-schooled in 1996-97. See id. at 117.
12. See Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-6084) (providing a framework for meeting national
education goals by raising standards, increasing resources, and improving school governance).
13. See William H. Clune, NewAnswers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the
Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and
Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721,755 (1992) ("School finance is the vehicle through which society
makes its critical decisions about investment in education.").
14. Between 1989 and 1995, enrollment at Florida public schools expanded by some 21.7%,
and enrollment is projected to continue to expand by some 8.9% between 1995 and 2007. See
NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PROJECTIONS OF EDUCATION STATISTICS TO 2007, at 106
(DebraE. Gerald &WilliamJ. Hussar, eds., NCES 97-382,1997). While the burden on elementary
schools is projected to taper off somewhat between 1995 and 2007, high school enrollment in
Florida will continue to expand drastically, with a projected increase of some 27.8% between 1995
and 2007. See id. at 112.
15. See 1998 DIG. OFEDUC. STAT., supra note 11, at 79. In 1993-94, average class sizes in
Florida were 26 for elementary schools and 26.6 for secondary schools; nationwide averages were
FLORIDA LAW REV1EW
schools almost twice the size of the nationwide average.1 6 Though Florida
schools may warehouse increasing numbers of students, education results
as measured by performance on standardized tests continue to decline,
consistently placing Florida students in the bottom quarter among the fifty
states.17 The result is children who do not graduate, or who graduate
unprepared to participate productively in the modem economy or in civil
society.
The role of education-related litigation has likewise expanded. The
courts have long been deeply involved with education in America."
Whether the question was who may go to what school,19 what may be
24.1 for elementary and 23.6 for secondary schools. See id. Florida ranks in the bottom five states
for both elementary and secondary schools based on class size. See ida
16. See id. at 119-20. In 1996-97, the average American elementary school had 478 students,
while the average Florida elementary school had 783 students, the highest average in the nation.
See id. at 119. Likewise, for secondary schools, while the U.S. average was 777 students in 1996-
97, Florida averaged 1,612 students in each secondary school, again the highest in the nation. See
id. at 120. Because they are co-terminus with counties, Florida school districts are also larger than
most others in the country. Six of the country's largest school districts based on enrollment are in
Florida. See id. at 116. The significance of these super-districts is that, while 50% of public school
students are enrolled in only 5% of the nation's school districts, it is these large districts that face
disproportionate problems of dropout rates and low achievement. Meanwhile, as administrative
bureaucracies grow, governance of these districts may become remote from and less accountable
for operations of individual schools. See James W. Guthrie, Reinventing Education Finance:
Alternatives for Allocating Resources to Individual Schools, in NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, SELECrED PAPERS IN SCHOOLFNANCE 1996, at 94 (William J. Fowler, ed., NCES 98-
217, 1998).
17. See 1998 DIG. OFEDUC. STAT., supra note 11, at 131, 138-39, 143 (showing that Florida
4th and 8th graders perform in the bottom quarter in reading, mathematics and science as measured
against other students nationwide). Florida high schoolers also perform lower than the U.S. average
on both the verbal and mathematics portion of the Scholastic Assessment Test (S.A.T.). See id. at
148.
18. See generally Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening
to the Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 169, 186-211 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court made the
following oft-quoted declaration affirming the importance of education to a free people:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
[Vol. 52
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taught in school,2" or how students should behave,2 courts have been
called upon to resolve these issues. This involvement of the courts would
seem to be inevitable, for as De Tocqueville aptly wrote, "Scarcely any
political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or
later, into a judicial question."22 Such is also the case with the issue of
education finance, even though these cases raise complex political and
educational issues that make them difficult for courts alone to resolve.
III. EDUCATION FINANCE DISPUTES IN OTHER STATES
A. Waves of Education Finance Litigation
Over the past twenty-five years, commentators have noted three
"waves" of education finance-related litigation in the United States. 23 The
first wave was based on the Equal Protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This wave ended with the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1974 decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,' that education is not a fundamental right under the
U.S. Constitution.'
Il at 493. Brown and its progeny of desegregation suits may well be the most visible example of
court involvement in schooling. Compare id. with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1973)
(affirming right of Amish parents to direct the education of their children over state attempts to
require education beyond the eighth grade).
20. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (invalidating a state law
forbidding foreign language instruction in schools).
21. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988); Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,677 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (all dealing with school discipline issues and free speech rights). See
generally Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A
DialogicApproach to Education Reform, 14 YALEL. &POL'YREV. 99, 110-13 (1996) (discussing
the explosion in school-related litigation); William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court:
The Supreme Court's Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 952-70 (1987) (noting that
these cases reflect a tension between traditional views of education as a means of transmitting a
common culture and progressive views of education that focus on individual development).
22. I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. XVI, at 280 (Everyman's
Library, 1994).
23. See, e.g., William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Implications of the Montana, Kentucky,
and Texas Decisions for the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC.
219, 221-22 (1990) (first noting these waves of litigation); Julie K. Underwood & William E.
Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. LL. & PUB. POL'Y 517,
520-35 (1991).
24. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
25. See id. at 35. The Court noted that "[e]ducation, of course, is not among the rights
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution." Id. (applying rational basis review).
Plaintiffs had been initially successful in otherEqual Protection-based suits prior to Rodriguez. See,
e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1). In Serrano I, the California
FLORDA LAW REVIEW
After the failure of the first "wave," reformers turned to state
26constitutions. The second wave of equity litigation was founded on both
state equal protection and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the education
provisions of state constitutions.27 Much like the prior federal equal
protection wave, this litigation wave focused on educational equity or lack
of educational equality, namely the disparity of both resources and quality
Supreme Court accepted plaintiffs' allegations that monetary inequalities in California's school
finance system violated both the state and federal equal protection guarantees by making education
"a function of the wealth of [(the child's)] parents and neighbors." Id. Following Serrano I, similar
suits were filed in nearly two-thirds of the states. See Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School
Finance Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1099, 1101 (1978).
Subsequent litigation in California upheld the declaration that the public school finance system
violated the state equal protection clause by discriminating against the poor, but granted only
declaratory relief. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 940 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977) (Serrano 11) (wherein the court stated that its declaration should not be "construed to require
the adoption of any particular system of school finance.").
Even after Rodriguez, several scholars see some evidence that there does exist some federal
constitutional right to a basic education. This is based, in part, on Rodriguez dicta that "some
ideniifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful
exercise' of federal rights. 411 U.S. at 36; see also Julius Chambers, Adequate EducationforAll:
A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 67-72 (1987) (exploring theories
supporting federal right to education); Erica B. Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right
to a Bilingual Education, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 87-92 (1974) (focusing on rights of non-
English speaking children); Lynch, supra note 11, at 970-86 (noting that state efforts to improve
education have been ineffective, and appealing for a federally recognized and uniform fundamental
right to an education); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective
Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 823-28 (1985).
26. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REV. 489,495-502 (1977) (applauding the expanding reliance upon state constitutional
rights and state constitutional jurisprudence which offers greater rights than those afforded under
the Federal Constitution). In an important passage in this article, Justice Brennan states:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be
allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for without it, the
full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
Id. at 491; c.f William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 535 (1986); Daniel
Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M.L. REV. 271,271(1998) (noting
that state constitutions "create the legal frameworks in which many of the basic regulatory decisions
affecting American citizens' lives are made").
27. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform,
48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 128-32 (1995); William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State
Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 20-21 (1993) [hereinafter
Role of Language]. William Thro notes that the state education clause was the basis for only two
successful pre-1989 education finance suits. See id. at 20-21 (These suits were Robinson I, in New
Jersey, and Seattle School District No. 1, in Washington.).
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of education between wealthier and poorer school districts which resulted
from an over-reliance on local property taxes to fund schools.28 From the
beginning of this wave in about 1973,29 through 1989, education finance
lawsuits were brought in at least forty-one states.
By 1989, courts in seven states had found their public school
financing systems unconstitutional for equity reasons,3° while litigation had
been unsuccessful in at least fifteen states.31 The result of the second equity
wave was a patchwork of inconsistent state court decisions, continuing
legal uncertainty as to the sufficiency of many education finance systems,
and, according to some commentators, a heavy price paid both in "the use
of judicial as well as political resources." '3
28. See, e.g., Richard J. Stark, Education Reform: Judicial Interpretation of State
Constitutions' Education Finance Provisions-Adequacy vs. Equality, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
609, 613-16 (describing these equity challenges).
29. See Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187,217 (N.J. 1972) (Robinson)) (declaring the New
Jersey school finance system unconstitutional for equity reasons, and basing the decision entirely
on the state constitution). Scholars have seen Robinson as the first of the "second" wave of equity
cases. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 27, at 129-35 (providing a useful summary of the long saga of
New Jersey education finance litigation); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance
Litigation, and the "Third Wave:" From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEmP. L. REV. 1151, 1159-61
(1995). See also Stanley H. Friedelbanm, Reactive Responses: The Complementary Role of Federal
and State Courts, 17 PUBUUS 33, 39-41 (1987) (describing the development of parallel state
equality guarantees after Rodriguez).
30. See generally Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30,651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano
I, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), affid, Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
907 (1977) (decision based on state equal protection provision); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359
(Conn. 1977); Robinson 1, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. I of King County v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); Pauley v. Kelley,
255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.
1980), cert. denied sub nom. Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washakie County Sch. Dist.
No. 1,449 U.S. 824 (1980).
31. See generally Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973) (en banc); Lujan v.
Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285
S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thomas v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Louisiana Ass'n of
Educators v. Edwards, 521 So. 2d 390 (La. 1988); Hombeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458
A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Governor v. State Treasurer, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); East Jackson
Pub. Schs. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Board ofEduc., Levittown Union Free
Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983); Britt
v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C.
1987); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980);
Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or.
1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470
(S.C. 1988); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, reh'g denied, 443 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. 1989).
32. Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts: The Aftermath of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30 VAL U.L.REV. 551,565
(1996).
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The "third wave" 33 of education finance litigation began in 1989 with
two decisions that also dealt with equity issues. In Rose v. Council for
Better Education, Inc.,34 the Kentucky Supreme Court accepted plaintiffs'
arguments that the Kentucky school finance system violated the equal
protection guarantee of the Kentucky constitution35 and the education
provision of the state constitution.36 The court relied exclusively on the
state constitution in affirming the lower court's decision for plaintiffs. 37
Exploring a litany of uncontroverted inadequacies in several districts and
the demonstrable poor results of Kentucky schools, 3 the Rose -court
declared the entire system of financing public education to be
unconstitutional. 39 The Kentucky legislature promptly responded with new
legislation that refinanced the public school system,' increasing revenues
by over a billion dollars.4' Most importantly, the Kentucky court set forth
several criteria explaining what would constitute an adequate education.42
These adequacy criteria, which have had great influence on other courts
considering their state constitution's education requirements, are as
follows:
33. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597,598 (1994) [hereinafter
JudicialAnalysis]; Enrich, supra note 27, at 109-10; Heise, supra note 29, at 1162-68; Stark, supra
note 28, at 643-66 (discussing the change of focus from equality to adequacy).
34. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
35. See KY. CONST. §§ 1 ("[aill men are, by nature, free and equal") and 3 ("[all men, when
they form a social compact, are equal").
36. See KY. CONST. § 183 (requiring state to "provide for an efficient system of common
schools").
37. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215.
38. See id. at 197; Stark, supra note 28, at 644-47 (detailing many of the factual inadequacies
and disparities among Kentucky schools).
39. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215. The Kentucky court emphasized the significance of its
decision:
Lest there be any doubt, the results of our decision is that Kentucky's entire
system of common schools is unconstitutional. There is no allegation that only
part of the common school system is invalid, and we find no such circumstance.
This decision applies to the entire sweep of the system-all its parts and parcels.
Id.
40. See The Kentucky Education Reform Act, 1990 Ky. Acts 476 (codified at KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 156.005-.990 (Baldwin's West 1998)).
41. See, e.g., Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Policy and Students' Opportunities to
Learn: Kentucky's Experience, in 7 THE FUTURE OF CHIMDREN 79-95 (Winter 1997) (praising
Kentucky's efforts to improve the equity of the system, while noting that other aspects of reforms
are slow to improve); C. Scott Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excellence in
Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 599, 599-604 (1995) (explaining the educational
assessment system introduced to measure educational reforms).
42. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-13.
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[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to
provide each and every child with at least the seven following
capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills
to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic,
social, and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of
governmental processes to enable the student to understand
the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation;
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to
enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and
historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so
as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work
intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or
vocational skills to enable public school students to compete
favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in
academics or in the job market.43
43. Id. at 212; see also Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979) (also giving
very specific criteria for adequacy under the state constitution)). West Virginia's influential criteria
for a "thorough and efficient!' education system are as follows:
It develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and
social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations,
recreation and citizenship, and does so economically.
Legally recognized elements in this definition are development in every child
to his or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2) ability to add, subtract, multiply and
divide numbers; (3) knowledge of government to the extent that the child will be
equipped as a citizen to make informed choices among persons and issues that
affect his own governance; (4) self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her total
environment to allow the child to intelligently choose life work-to know his or
her options; (5) work-training and advanced academic training as the child may
intelligently choose; (6) recreational pursuits; (7) interest in all creative arts, such
as music, theater, literature, and the visual arts; (8) social ethics, both behavioral
and abstract, to facilitate compatibility with others in this society.
Implicit are supportive services: (1) good physical facilities, instructional
materials and personnel; (2) careful state and local supervision to prevent waste
and to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency.
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 876 (citing Robinson I1). The West Virginia court also found a fundamental
right to education under that state's constitution. See id. at 879 (applying strict scrutiny to its review
of the education finance system).
Both theRose and Pauley criteria have often been cited by other states in considering their own
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Ex Parte James, 713 So. 2d 869, 879 (Ala. 1997); Opinion of
the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 155 (Ala. 1993); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ.,
615 N.E.2d 516,554-55 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1358-59
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The Kentucky reforms led initially to visible improvement in both the
overall equity of Kentucky's public schools, and in the adequacy of the
education they provide.44
The second new adequacy case was a Montana decision, Helena
Elementary School District No. 1 v. State.45 Helena combined equity with
adequacy issues, but concluded by finding that the state failed to
"adequately fund" the state school system,46 noting that this in turn "failed
to provide a system of quality public education granting to each student the
equality of educational opportunity guaranteed."' Both Rose and Helena
shared some aspects of previous equity cases, but introduced a novel
exploration of the "adequacy" or overall sufficiency of an entire system of
education. These two successes led reformers to hope that adequacy
arguments might offer a winning strategy in education finance litigation.48
The idea of focusing on adequacy as requiring some basic level of
educational quality was also attractive to those who realized that equity
arguments often failed in court or in the public forum by pitting poorer
districts against richer districts, raising poor schools only by handicapping
those schools that are succeeding.49 The exclusive reliance upon an
(N.H. 1997); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d
733, 741 (Ohio 1997); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999).
44. See Quality Counts '98, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 8, 1998, at 161 (giving Kentucky a "B" in
funding adequacy, and a "B+" in the equity of its education funding). Kentucky began its reforms
from an extremely low level relative to other states, ranking last or near last in adult literacy, high
school completion, and K-12 per-pupil spending. See Quality Counts '97, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 22,
1997, at 114. Kentucky's struggle is not over, however, and recent measurements indicate some
decline in both its levels of equity and adequacy, prompting renewed modifications of Kentucky's
Education Reform Act. See Quality Counts '99, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 11, 1999, at 147.
45. 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
46. Id, at 690.
47. Id. Some scholars regard Helena as the proper beginning of the "third wave" of adequacy
litigation, while others see in Helena a continuation of second wave equity cases. Compare William
E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Implications of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisionsfor the
Future ofPublic School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &EDUC. 219,238-39 (1990) andThro,
JudicialAnalysis, supra note 33, at 603 (seeing the first emergence of third wave adequacy cases)
with Enrich, supra note 27, at 138 n. 192 (finding an equity claim as the basis for Helena). But see
Heise, supra note 29, at 1163 (finding a basis for both theories in Helena's combination of equity
and adequacy terminology.
48. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 29, at 1162-66; Molly McUsic, The Use ofEducation Clauses
in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 326 n.87 (1991); Stark, supra
note 28, at 665-69; Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 23, at 536-37; Gail F. Levine, Note,
Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 507-08 (1991).
49. See Enrich, supra note 27, at 166-73 (contrasting the appeal of adequacy's argument for
basic minimal education levels with the traditional equality argument that "immediately suggests
a zero-sum game in which the lot of the worse off can only be improved at the expense of the better
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educational clause was attractive because these provisions, unlike equal
protection, may have fewer ramifications and unforeseen effects on other
areas of the law.50 Furthermore, a focus on adequacy preserved the
flexibility of local districts to go beyond minimal requirements.51 As with
the equity wave, however, results of third wave adequacy litigation are
mixed. Since 1989, courts in twelve states have found their education
systems unconstitutional based in whole or in part on adequacy issues.5 In
off"); Heise, supra note 29, at 1174-75 (noting adequacy's appeal to our ideas of "fairness and
opportunity" and useful relation to an "emerging educational standards movement"); 4 Leandro,
488 S.E.2d at 259 (N.C. 1997) (distinguishing between a right to equal educational opportunities
and the adequacy right to a "sound basic education').
50. See Judicial Analysis, supra note 33, at 603-04.
51. See Enrich, supra note 27, at 170 (noting that "adequacy [need not] constrain the
prerogative of a local district to dedicate additional resources to its schools or to develop
educational programs that distinguish it from its neighbors").
52. See generally Ex Parte James, 713 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 1997); Opinion of the Justices, 624
So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (advisory opinion to legislature on necessity of complying with lower court
decision in Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R, 1993 WL 204093 (Ala.
Cir. Ct. 1993)); Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989); Committee for Educ. Equality v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1994); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott I);
Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) (Abbott V); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio
1997); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (Edgewood ); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384
(Vt. 1997); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995). In Texas, legislative
reforms were twice struck down as insufficient. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804
S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood II); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489,524 (Tex..1992) (EdgewoodIII) (striking down the
second attempt because it improperly levied taxes, not on education adequacy grounds). On the
third attempt, Texas courts upheld the education finance system against further constitutional
attacks. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717,725 (Tex. 1995) (Edgewood
V) (warning, however, that "judgment in this case should not be interpreted as a signal that the
school finance crisis in Texas has ended"). New Jersey, on the other hand, rejected school finance
reforms for a fifth time in 1994, and again, in part, in 1997. See Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575,576
(N.J. 1994) (Abbott Ill); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 456 (N.J. 1997) [hereinafter Abbott IV].
In Arizona, likewise, courts have twice rejected education finance reform legislation on both equity
and adequacy grounds. See Hull, 950 P.2d at 1146; Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634,637-39 (Ariz.
1998) (rejecting revised legislation mainly on equity grounds because funding mechanism would
produce unacceptable spending disparities between local districts).
Equity issues remain important even in adequacylitigation, and indeed a system, to be adequate,
should also be equitable. See Robert M. Jensen,Advancing Education Through Education Clauses
of State Constitutions, BYU Euc. & L. 1, 27-34 (1997) (describing these "hybrid" claims that
combine adequacy with equity). For example, in the successful 1993 Tennessee case, the court
looked more to state equal protection than to the education clause of the state constitution when it
invalidated the state's education finance system. See Tennessee Small School Systems, 851 S.W.2d
at 152-57. Although the education clause was held to provide an "enforceable standard," the court
another twelve states, courts have upheld their education systems,5 3 orhave
found the issue non-justiciable.5 4 In a further three states, litigation has
been allowed to proceed, but there has been no final resolution of the
case.
55
B. Education and State Constitutions
Every state has some education provision in its state constitution. 6
did not articulate or define this standard, relying instead on traditional equity arguments of funding
disparities between richer and poorer districts in concluding that the education system was
inadequate. See id. at 151-52; see also Enrich, supra note 27, at 139-40 (discussing mixture of
equity and adequacy arguments in recent cases, and noting that equity issues often predominate).
The same mixture of equity and adequacy arguments is also present in recent Texas, Arizona and
New Jersey litigation. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 394-97; Hull, 950 P.2d at 637; Abbott IV,
693 A.2d at 456; see also Stark, supra note 28, at 641-43.
53. See Matanuska-Susitna v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ.
Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993); Exira Community Sch. Dist. v. State, 512
N.W.2d 787 (Iowa 1994); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Charlet
v. State, 713 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1998); School Admin. Dist. No. I v. Commissioner, 659
A.2d 854 (Me. 1995); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d
349 (Neb. 1993); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. #1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994) (three of five
justices found education system unconstitutional, but state constitution required super-majority of
four justices to strike down a statute); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d
116 (Or. 1991); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994). Note, however, that even in
upholding their'systems, some courts found a constitutional requirement that the state meet certain
education standards. See Idaho Sch.forEqual Educ. Opportunity, 850 P.2d at 734-35. Some courts
which have rejected challenges have noted that plaintiffs did not allege how funding disparities
have affected education quality. See, e.g., Gould, 506 N.W.2d at 353; Exira Community Sch. Dist.,
512 N.W.2d at 795; Jensen, supra note 52, at 38-39.
54. See Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,
409 (Fla. 1996); Lewis v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (111. 1999); Committee for Educ. Rights v.
Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Marrero by Tobales v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998); City of Pawtucket v. Sandlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
55. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro v.
State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C.
1999). Each of these cases overruled lower court decisions that adequacy issues under the
respective state education provision were non-justiciable, and allowed litigation to proceed.
56. See ALA. CONST art. XIV, § 256 ("a liberal system of public schools"); ALASKACONST.
art. VII, § 1 ("a system of public schools"); ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § I ("a general and uniform
public school system"); ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 ("a general, suitable and efficient system of free
public schools"); CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1 ("encourage [education] by all suitable means") & 5
("a system of common schools"); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("a thorough and uniform system of
free public schools"); CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("free public elementary and secondary
schools"); DEL. CONST. art. X, § I ("a general and efficient system of free public schools"); FLA.
CONST. art. IX, § I ("Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure,
and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality
education"); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("provision of an adequate public education... shall be a
primary obligation of the State"); HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("a statewide system of public schools");
IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common
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Though these provisions differ widely, depending on the history of the
provision and its intent and scope, 7 the result is to make education a state
legislative responsibility."8 Considering the wording of the various
schools"); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("an efficient system of high quality public educational
institutions and services"); IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("a general and uniform system of Common
Schools"); IOWACONST. art. IX, § 3 ("The general assembly shall encourage, by all suitable means,
the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement"); KAN. CONST. art.
VI, § 1 ("establishing and maintaining public schools"); KY. CONST. § 183 ("an efficient system
of common schools"); LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 ("a public educational system"); ME. CONST. art.
VIn, pt. 1, § 1 ("the Legislature are authorized, and it shall be their duty to require, the several
towns to make suitable provision at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public
schools"); MD. CONST. art. VIII, § I ("a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools");
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2 ("to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all
seminaries of them; especially the University at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools
in the towns"); MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("a system of free public elementary and secondary
schools"); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 ("a general and uniform system of public schools"); MIss.
CONS'T. art. VIII, § 201 ("provide for the establishment, maintenance and support of free public
schools"); MO. CONSF. art. IX, § 1 (a) ("establish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous
instruction"); MONT. CONSr. art. X, § 1 ("a basic system of free quality public elementary and
secondary schools"); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("free instruction in the common schools"); NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 2 ("a uniform system of common schools"); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII
("cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools"); N.J.
CONST. art. VIII, § 4 ("a thorough and efficient system of free public schools"); N.M. CONST. art.
XII, § I ("a uniform system of free public schools"); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("a system of free
common schools"); N.C. CONS-F. art. IX, § 2 ("a general and uniform system of free public
schools"); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("auniform system of free public schools"); OHIOCONST. art.
VI, § 2 ("a thorough and efficient system of common schools"); OKLA. CONSF. art. XIII, § 1 ("a
system of free public schools"); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("a uniform, and general system of
common schools"); PA. CONS-F. art. III, § 14 ("a thorough and efficient system of public
education"); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("duty of general assembly to promote public schools, and
to adopt all means which they may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the
advantages and opportunities of education"); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3 ("a system of free public
schools"); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § I ("a general and uniform system of public schools"); TENN.
CONST. art. XI, § 12 ("a system of free public schools"); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("an efficient
system of public free schools"); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1 ("establishment and maintenance of the
State's education system"); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68 ("a competent number of schools ought to be
maintained in each town"); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § I ("a system of free public elementary and
secondary schools"); WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1 ( It is the paramount duty of the state to make
ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders") & 2 ("a general and
uniform system of public schools"); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § I ("a thorough and efficient system
of free schools"); WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 ("the establishment of district schools, which shall be as
nearly uniform as practicable"); WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("a complete and uniform system of
public instruction").
57. For more on state constitutional history with regard to education, see, e.g., KERN
ALEXANDER & RICHARD G. SAMON, PUBL[C SCHOOL FINANCE 2-11 (1995); ADOLPHE E. MEYER,
AN EDUCATIONHISTORYOFTHE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1957); Sparkman, supra note 3, at 570-78. See
also Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 408-09 (Overton, J., concurring).
58. Cf. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("Education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments"). See generally Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under
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education clauses of state constitutions, scholars have divided them into
four general categories based upon the level of the duty imposed upon the
respective state legislature. 9 Category I provisions merely mandate some
system of free public schools with no requirement as to support or
quality.' Category II provisions impose some minimal standard of
quality.61 Category II provisions strengthen this standard by adding some
specific mandate.62 Category IV provisions make education a very
important duty of the state, and impose the highest mandate of support.63
As ranked by these scholars, 64 eighteen states can be categorized as
Category I, merely mandating that the state provide some system of free
public schools.65 An example of a Category I state is Oklahoma, whose
constitution requires that "[tihe legislature shall establish and maintain a
system of free public schools wherein all the children of the State may be
educated."' Such language makes no mention of any standard of quality
for the schools, and, so long as the system of free schools is established,
the state constitutional mandate would seem to be met.
Category II states include twenty-two states with some minimum
qualitative standard of education.67 Category II constitutions include
State Constitutional Law, 65 TEM. L. REv. 1325, 1343-48 (1992) (surveying state education
clauses).
59. See, e.g., Grubb, supra note 25, at 66-70; McUsic, supra note 48, at 333-39; Ratner,
supra note 25 at, 814-16 n. 143-146; Role of Language, supra note 27, at 19. See also Barbara J.
Staros, School Finance Litigation in Florida: A HistoricalAnalysis, 23 STETsoNL. REv. 497,498-
99 (1994) (applying this standard to Florida's present and past constitutions).




64. William Thro's synthesis of Grubb and Ratner's categorizations is probably the most
workable. See The Role of Language, supra note 27, at 23-25.
65. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARM CONST. art. XI, §
1; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a);
NEB. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; OKIA.
CONST. art. XHI, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68.
Mississippi, omitted from Thro's list, is placed in Category I by other scholars. See Miss. CONST.
art. VIII, § 201; cf The Role of Language, supra note 27, at 23-25; Heise, supra note 29, at 1159
n.64; McUsic, supra note 48, at 311 n.5.
66. OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
67. See ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; COLO. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2; DEL CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST. art.
XII, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CoNST. art. VI, § 3; OR. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII,
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Pennsylvania's requirement that the legislature provide for "maintenance
and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education., 68 This
"thorough and/or efficient" language is typical of Category II education
clauses.69 Thus, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
West Virginia and Wyoming have "thorough and efficient" requirements;
Colorado, Idaho and Montana require "thorough" systems; and Arkansas,
Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky and Texas require "efficient systems."
Another variation of Category II clauses is the "uniformity" requirement
present in Florida, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Utah. An example of
the remaining versions is Virginia's somewhat exceptional provision
requiring "an educational program of high quality."7
The six Category IEI states have education clauses which go beyond
this minimal standard by including some stronger or more specific mandate
(including "all means" or a purpose preamble).7' Of these Category III
states, California combines a purpose preamble with a strong mandate,
providing: "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence .being
essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement."72 Likewise,
Rhode Island's constitution requires that the legislature "promote public
schools.., and.., adopt all means which it may deem necessary and
proper to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of
education. 73
Finally, there are four Category IV states, specifically making
education an important, if not the most important, duty of the state.74 Thus,
Washington's constitution closely resembles the language of Florida's
1868 constitution,75 stating: "It is the paramount duty of the state to make
ample provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste,
68. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
69. See William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1663 (1989)
[hereinafter To Render Them Safe].
70. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
71. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 2; NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 2; R.I. CoNsT. art. XII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
72. CAL CONST. art. IX, § 1. This clause is supplemented by a strong funding clause. See
CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 ("From all state revenues there shall first be set apart the monies to be
applied by the state for support of the public school system and public institutions of higher
education.").
73. R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
74. See GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, 1 1 & § 8, 1; ILL CONST. art. X, § 1; ME. CONST. art.
VIII, pt. 1, § 1; and WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
75. See infra notes 94-96, and accompanying text (discussingthe 1868 Florida Constitution).
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or sex."'76 Washington alone makes education "the paramount duty,"
though Georgia, Illinois and Michigan make education a "primary duty."
Illinois states in its constitution that "[a] fundamental goal of the People of
the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities."77 Georgia's Category IV education clause states "[t]he
provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall be a
primary obligation of the State of Georgia... [the expense of] which shall
be provided for by taxation. 7 8
In Florida, this categorization is significant, particularly because the
Supreme Court took notice of it in Coalition for Adequacy,' 9 noting that
Florida went from a Category IV state under its 1868 Constitution to a
Category II state under its current Constitution (prior to the 1998
revision).8 0 As shall be seen, the Constitution Revision Commission also
stressed the significance of these categories by announcing an intention to
restore Florida's constitutional standard to the Category IV "paramount
duty" used in the 1868 Constitution." As a practical matter, however, some
of the effective distinction between categories has blurred to differing
results in recent education finance cases.8 2 To an extent, broad
76. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Following this preamble, Section 2 mandates that the
legislature "provide for a general and uniform system of public schools." WASH. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2.
77. ILL CONST. art. X, § 1.
78. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, 1. This provision is supplemented by a further requirement
that "[t]he General Assembly shall by taxation provide for an adequate education for the citizens
of Georgia." GA. CONST. art. VII, § 8, 9[ 1.
79. See 680 So. 2d. at 405 n.7 (citing Staros, supra note 59, at 498-99).
80. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
81. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (intention of CRC to increase Florida
educational clause from Category II to higher Category IV standard); cf. infra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text (discussing the Florida Constitution of 1868).
82. For example, in numerous states with "thorough and efficient" or "efficient" in their
education clauses (usually considered Category II), courts have found standards sufficient to
invalidate the state's education finance systems. See, e.g., DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at I (finding strict
and meaningful standards in the "thorough and efficient" language of Ohio's education clause);
Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 408; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-13; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877. Likewise, in
North Carolina, regarded as Category I, see To Render Them Safe, supra note 69, at 1661 n.106,
courts have allowed litigation to proceed on adequacy grounds, reading significant qualitative
standards into North Carolina's education provision. See Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254-55 (citing
Rose and Pauley).
Meanwhile, in Illinois, a Category IV state, the court has consistently rejected attempts to define
adequacy under its state constitution. See Lewis, 710 N.E.2d at 802-04; Committee for Educ.
Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1188-93 (rejecting other states' definitions of "efficient" and finding
adequacy a nonjusticiable political question); cf. Danson, 399 A.2d at 365; Marrero by Tabales v.
Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956, 963-66 (Penn. Super. Ct. 1998) (Pennsylvania's "thorough and
efficient" clause establishes only a "minimum" or "basic" education and is matter for legislature
alone); Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 776 ("thorough and efficient" clause commands only that legislature
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categorization may also attribute intent to framers of state constitutions,
when these framers simply "borrowed" the wording of their education
provisions from other states.8 3 By comparison, Florida's intent is recent,
clear, and available. Nonetheless, the states form a useful "universe of
constitutions" to which various state courts can turn for assistance in
interpreting analogous provisions."
During the course of more than twenty-five years of education finance
litigation, much of it has focused on the education provisions of state
constitutions. Attempts to modify the constitutional text, and so alter the
playing field, have been rare. In 1992, Illinois voters narrowly rejected a
proposed constitutional amendment which would have changed that state's
Category IV provision to make education the "paramount duty" of the
state, and give the state "preponderant financial responsibility" for funding
the school system.8' Although a majority of voters approved the proposal,
it failed to receive the 60% of votes necessary to amend the Illinois
Constitution. 6 The amendment failed, in part, because of fears that the
"preponderant financial responsibility" language would require large
increases in state taxation.87 Again, in 1996, Nebraska voters considered
and rejected an initiative amendment; 1996 Initiative 411 would have
created a fundamental right to a "quality education" in Nebraska, would
have created a "fundamental right" to public education for all people ages
5 through 21, and finally would have directed the state legislature to
establish a funding system to provide for "thorough education in efficiently
operated schools."8 8
provide students "with a basic public school education"). Likewise, Georgia, another Category IV
state, left definition of "adequacy" to the legislative branch). See McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 165.
Rhode Island, nominally considered Category III, has found no judicially manageable standards in
its education provision, and the court declined to interfere in the legislature's sphere. See City of
Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 58-59.
83. See To Render Them Safe, supra note 69, at 1659 (pointing to the virtually identical
education provisions in fifteen states). Thro, points out, however, that even when framers chose to
borrow an education clause, their choice as to which clause should be borrowed may be significant.
See id, at 1659 n.100.
84. See G.ALANTARR, UNDERSTANDINGSTATECONSTrTUTONS 199-200(1998) (discussing
the attention paid by state courts to the decisions of other states); cf. New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that states often serve as
laboratories to "try novel social and economic experiments"). But see James A. Gardner, The
"States-as-Laboratories" Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 475
(1996) (questioning this model of state constitutional jurisprudence).
85. Referendums, CHICAGOTRIB., Nov. 5,1992, at C7.
86. See id.
87. See Rob Karwath & Cindy Schreuder, Close callfor education amendment, CHICAGO
TRM., Nov. 4, 1992, at Li; Rick Pearson, Tax fears hurting school amendment, CHICAGO Tam.,
Nov. 2, 1992, at Cl.
88. In full, the amendment provided:
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Both initiatives were rejected by voters in the 1996 election.89 Voters
feared that the limits on property taxes would result in new sales and
income taxes to pay for education improvements, as well as the risk of new
litigation.90 The lack of change in other states' constitutional provisions
means there is thus no parallel for the work of Florida's Constitution
Revision Commission, which has so changed the landscape for education
in Florida.
IV. EDUCATION AND THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
A. Constitutional Provisions Related to Education
Some provision for education has been a feature of every one of
Florida's six constitutions.91 The Constitutions of 1838, 1861 and 1865
contained similar education clauses.' These provisions contained no
Quality education is essential to the survival of a free society and is a fundamental
right of each individual. It is the paramount duty of the State to provide for the
thorough and efficient education for all individuals between the ages of five and
twenty-one years who are enrolled in the common school of the State. The
Legislature may provide for the education of other persons in educational
institutions owned and controlled by the state or a political subdivision thereof.
See Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. 95095, at 626-27 (1995) (noting that the proposal would, if adopted, give
Nebraska "the most stringent education clause in the United States"). Initiative 411, along with
another initiative proposing to limit property taxes, were both sponsored by the State Education
Association and the Nebraska Farm Bureau. The two initiatives were originally combined, but
separated by the attorney general for violating that state's single subject requirement. See Neb. Op.
Att'y Gen. 96005, at 598 (1996).
89. See Stephen Buttry, School, Property-Tax Initiatives Fall in Face of Strong Opposition,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 6, 1996, at 8 (noting that the education amendment received only
22% of the vote).
90. See, e.g., Stephen Buttry, Nebraskans Give Boot to Initiatives411, 412, OMAHAWORLD-
HERALD, Nov. 6, 1996, at 1; Paul Hammel, Education Amendment Could Be Costly, Opinion Says,
OMAHAWORLD-HERALD, Dec. 12, 1995, at 1.
91. See FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. X, §§ 1, 2; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. X, §§ 1, 2; FLA.
CONST. of 1865, art. 10, §§ 1, 2; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, §§ 1,2; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art.
XII, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE
CONsTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1991); THOMAS E. COCHRAN, HISTORY OF PUBLIC-SCHOOL
EDUCATIO N FLORIDA 15, 34-36, 79-84 (Florida Dept. of Educ., 1921) (providing historical
analysis of education article of previous constitutions); see generally TARR, supra note 84, at 201-
05 (discussing the use of prior constitutions in constitutional interpretation).
92. Article X of the 1838 Constitution provided:
Section 1. The proceeds of all lands that have been, or may hereafter be,
granted by the United States for the use of schools and a seminary
or seminaries of learning, shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the
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constitutional requirement or standards, focusing rather on the proceeds of
lands dedicated for education purposes.93 The Reconstruction Constitution
of 1868, however, greatly expanded the education article from two to nine
sections.94 This expanded article made a declaration, in Article VIII,
Section 1, that it was the "paramount duty of the State to make ample
provision for education."'95 Article VIII, Section 2 first introduced the
requirement for a "uniform system of common schools. 96
When in 1885, after Reconstruction, Florida again adopted a new
constitution, the education article was modified once more. Although the
requirement for a "uniform system of public free schools" was retained,97
the language making education "the paramount duty" was removed.98 In
interest of which, together with all moneys derived from any other
source applicable to the same object, shall be inviolably
appropriated to the use of schools and seminaries of learning,
respectively, and to no other purpose.
Section 2. The general assembly shall take such measures as may be necessary
to preserve from waste or damage all lands so granted and
appropriated to the purposes of education.
FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. X, §§ 1-2. Article X, sections 1 and 2, of the 1861 Constitution and
Article 10, Sections 1 and 2, of the 1865 Constitution are, as the Supreme Court noted in Coalition,
"almost identical" to the 1838 provision. Coalition forAdequacy, 680 So. 2d at 405.
93. These lands, the sixteenth section in every township, were granted to Florida by Act of
Congress on March 3, 1845, 5 Stat. 742, for school purposes. The lands also include other swamp
and overflowed lands granted by Act of Congress of September 28, 1850,9 Stat. 519. Article VIn,
Section 4 of the 1868 Constitution provided that twenty-five per cent of the sales of other public
lands also should be paid into the Common School Fund, which was also to include proceeds of
escheated or forfeited lands, unspecified donations and appropriated. These provisions continued
under the 1885 Constitution. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 4; see also State ex rel. Town of
Crescent City v. Holland, 10 So. 2d 577,582-83 (Fla. 1942) (discussing the history of these lands
and the meaning of "public lands").
94. See FLA. CoNsT. of 1868, art. VIII, §§ 1-9.
95. Id. § 1. In full, article VIII, section 1 provided: "It is the paramount duty of the State to
make ample provision for the education of all the children residing within its borders, without
distinction or preference."
96. Id. § 2. In full, article VIII, section 2 provided: '"The legislature shall provide a uniform
system of common schools and a university, and shall provide for the liberal maintenance of the
same. Instruction in them shall be free." See generally D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 91, at 7 (1991);
Staros, supra note 59, at 500-01.
97. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 1.
98. Id. Though the written record of the 1885 Constitution does not confirm this, the fact that
the language from the article VIII, section 1 of the 1868 Constitution making education
"paramount" and requiring education provision for all Florida children "without distinction or
preference" were removed, and a section added to the 1885 Constitution explicitly requiring racial
segregation even with "impartial provision" (article XII, section 12), may suggest that in their zeal
to overturn the Reconstruction Constitution, drafters of the 1885 Constitution wished to prevent
both mixed-race schooling and any real "equality" requirement for the supposedly "separate but
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full, the 1885 section provided: "The Legislature shall provide for a
uniform system of public free schools, and shall provide for the liberal
maintenance of the same."99 When the current Constitution was adopted in
1968, the "uniform system" requirement was included along with the
requirement that "adequate provision be made by law" for its support."°
Education was once financed mainly through local ad valorem taxes,
and this remains an important source of education funds. Since the
establishment of the current Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP)
in 1973,101 education has been financed through both state and local funds.
The stated purpose of the FEFP is to "guarantee to each student... the
availability of programs and services appropriate to his educational needs
which are substantially equal to those available to any other student
notwithstanding geographic differences and varying local economic
factors."' 02 Instead of basing state assistance on the number of teachers or
classrooms, the FEFP adjusts funding based on the number of individual
pupils, counted in terms of "full-time equivalents" (FTE's), with
differential costs assigned to differing types of educational programs.' 3 By
multiplying these weighted FTE's by a base student allocation set by the
legislature, and by cost differentials based on different districts, the
equal" schools established for African-American children. See COCHRAN, supra note 91, at 79-84
(noting that the 1885 Constitution "formally guarded against coeducation of the races"); CHARLTON
W. TEBEAU, AHISTORYOFFLORIDA 288-90 (1971) (discussing the use of the 1885 Constitution to
remove African-Americans from public life in Florida); J. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONST.
CONVENTION OFTHE STATE OFFLORIDA 71,214 (1885) (discussing presentation and adoption of
the educational provisions).
99. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 1. Another significant change in the 1885 Constitution
was the creation of an elected Superintendent of Public Instruction position. See id., art. XII, § 2.
Another of the 1997-98 CRC's proposals, Revision 8, relating to Cabinet Reform, abolished the
elected position of Education Commissioner (successor to the superintendent under the 1968
Constitution), along with the Cabinet's supervisory role as the State Board of Education. In its place
after 2003, the Governor will appoint the members of the State Board of Education, which will
itself appoint the Commissioner of Education. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1999).
100. FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. IX, § 1. This provision, prior to the 1998 revision, read in full:
"Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform system of free public schools and for the
establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public
education programs that the needs of the people may require." Id
101. See 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-345 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ch. 236). See
generally 1999-2000FUNDINGFORFLORIDASCHOOLDSTRICrS,STATISTICALREPORT 3-5 (Florida
Dept. ofEduc., 1999); Ralph Kimbrough etal., Governmentand Education, in FLORIDA'SPOuTICS
AND GOVERNMENT 427-30 (Manning J. Dauer, ed., 2d ed. 1984); Staros, supra note 59, at 505-10
(reviewing the history of the Minimum Foundation Program and its replacement, the FEFP); cf.
ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 57, at 191-229 (describing education finance systems in other
states).
102. FLA. STAT. § 236.012(1).
103. See 1999-2000 FUNDING FOR FLORIDA SCHOOLDISTRICTS, STATISTICALREPORT, supra
note 101, at 1.
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legislature determines the base funding from state and local FEFP funds.'04
Each year, the legislature sets the percentage to be financed by state and
local funds. 5 Local funding is composed of "required local effort" and
discretionary ad valorem tax levies.1°6 In 1997-98, school districts in
Florida received 50.58% of their funding from the state, 41.94% from local
sources, and 7.48% from the federal government."0 7 This allocation is
comparable to the overall national average.'0 8 The Florida lottery
contributes revenues to the Educational Enhancement Trust Fund, from
which the legislature appropriated some $151,535,000 in 1999-2000 for
public schools.1' 9
The first Constitution Revision Commission under the 1968
Constitution, met in 1977-78 and considered possible changes to the
education provision of the Florida Constitution. One option involved an
amendment of Article I, Section 2, and would have guaranteed every
person "a right to equal educational opportunity."' 0 Another proposal
104. See a
105. See FLA. STAT. § 236.081(1)(b).
106. FLA. STAT. § 236.081(4) (required local effort); § 236.25(1) (discretionary tax levies).
The discretionary tax levies may include levies of up to 2.0 mills for certain capital outlay and
maintenance purposes, as well as up to 0.510 mills, with a supplemental 0.25 mills, for current
operation purposes. See FLA. STAT. §§ 236.25(2), .25(5)(a) (by 2004, discretionary millage should
only be used for facilities construction or repair, leasing of facilities, equipment or materials; or
purchase or lease of school buses); 1999-2000 FUNDNG FOR FLOPIDA SCHOOL DISTRICTS,
STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 3-5.
107. See 1999-2000 FUNDING FOR FLORIDA SCHOOL DISTRICTS, STATISTICAL REPORT, supra
note 101, at 2. In 1995-96, state funds made up about 48.6% of Florida education spending, with
local funds accounting for 40.2%. See 1998 DIG. OFEDUC. STAT., at 170. The remaining 7.4% of
education funding represented federal monies. See id. The State, in 1999-2000, appropriated some
$5.6 billion mainly from General Revenue to finance the FEFP, and set about $3.87 billion in
required local effort. See 1999-2000 FUNDNG FOR FLORIDA SCHOOL DISTRICTS, STATISTICAL
REPORT, supra note 101, at 2-3.
108. See 1998 DIG. OF EDUC. STAT., at 170. These Florida statistics compare with a U.S.
average of 47.5% state, 43.2% local, and 6.6% federal funds for education. See ieL The percentage
of state funds used in education varies from highs of 73.9% (New Mexico), 68% (Washington);
66.8% (Michigan), 66.6% (Delaware), 66.1% (Alaska) and 63% (West Virginia); to lows of 7.0%
(New Hampshire), 27.3% (Illinois), 29.7% (South Dakota) and 31.1% (Virginia). See id. Hawaii
and D.C. have but one school district, and are omitted from comparison. See id.; see generally
Penny L. Howell & Barbara B. Miller, Sources of Funding forSchools, 7 THE FUTURE OFCHILDREN
39-49 (Winter 1997) (reviewing education finance in the several states).
109. See 1999 Fla. Laws, ch. 99-226, § 1. These specific lottery funds come from a total of
$784,697,504 in lottery monies appropriated to general education purposes in 1999-2000. See id.
An additional $180 million in lottery monies went to school capital outlay programs and
$103,765,000 went to pre-school projects. See id. Most of the rest of the lottery monies went to
scholarship programs ($130 million), community colleges ($95 million) and universities ($104
million), and thus did not directly benefit K-12 public education. See id.
110. FLORIDA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, FINAL SUMMARY OFACTION TAKEN ON
ALL COMMISSION PROPOSALS 1 (1978) (CRC proposal 26).
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would have expanded Article IX, Section 1 to include the right "to an
efficient and high quality education from the kindergarten to the secondary
level." ' Although these two proposals were withdrawn, the 1978
Constitution Revision Commission did offer a subsection (b) to Article IX,
Section 1, which stated that the primary purpose of elementary and
secondary education was "to develop the ability of each student to read,
communicate and compute." 2 This proposal, along with every one of the
1978 Constitution Revision Commission's other proposals, was rejected
by Florida voters. 113
B. Litigation Related to Education Finance in Florida
Until recently, education-related litigation played a very minor role
in defining the state's responsibilities with regard to education finance.
Early education litigation in Florida focused on the meaning and extent of
the "uniform system" requirement in the Education Article. The first case
to do so, State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson,14 examined the clause under the
1885 Constitution, and found that the "uniform system" requirement
required public schools that were "established upon principles that are of
uniform operation throughout the state and that such system be liberally
maintained."'' 5 The Supreme Court noted in Henderson that "the purpose
intended to be accomplished in establishing" the uniform system of free
public schools was "to advance and maintain proper standards of
enlightened citizenship." 16
111. Id. at 39 (CRC proposal 78); see Staros, supra note 59, at 503-04 (summarizing the
history of these two proposals).
112. FLORIDA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, PROPOSED REVISION OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTTUTION 20 (1978). This proposal included provision for vocational training and instructional
assistance for special needs students. See id. Cabinet reform, another 1978 CRC proposal, included
the amendment of article IX, section 2 to make the State Board of Education an appointed body,
and a new article IX, section 7 to constitutionalize the State Board of Regents. See id; see also
MANNINGJ. DAUER, PROPOSED 1978 FLORIDA CONSTITUTION REVISION AND PROPOSALON CASINO
GANMBING 24-25 (1978) (offering a brief analysis of the 1978 CRC proposals); Patricia A. Draper,
A New Look for Public Education: The Proposed Revision of Florida's Educational Governance
System, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 851 (1978) (discussing the structural changes to the pubic education
system); Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The
Increasing Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA L.
&POL'Y SYMP. 1, 15-17 (1996).
113. See Steven J. Uhlfelder & Robert A. McNeely, The 1978 Constitution Revision
Commission: Florida's Blueprint for Change, 18 NoVAL. REV. 1489, 1490-91 (1994).
114. 188 So. 351 (Fla. 1939).
115. Id. at352.
116. Id. at 353. In the 1970s, a series of cases involving the levy of local discretionary millage
came before the court which implicated the "uniform system" of public schools. In one of these,
School Bd. of Escambia County v. State, 353 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 1977), the Supreme Court of
Florida expanded its definition of uniformity, holding that "by definition ... a uniform system
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Two more recent cases focus on the specific requirements of the
current "uniform system" provision. In St. Johns County v. Northeast
Florida Builders,"7 the Florida Supreme Court examined a county
ordinance which imposed an impact fee on building permits in order to pay
for new school facilities. The ordinance excluded from the impact fee those
households which did not have children. The Court found that an impact
fee on building permits did not in itself violate the uniformity clause of
Article IX, Section 1.118 However, the exemption for households without
children was regarded by the Court as transforming the impact fee into a
"user fee" which violated Article IX, Section l's requirement that public
schools be free. 9 The Court rejected arguments that the scheme violated
the uniform system requirement by introducing local variations in public
school finance, declaring that uniformity requires only that every student
have an equal chance to achieve the basic educational goals set by the
legislature, not that the education must in fact be equal.'
results when the constituent parts, although unequal in number, operate subject to a common plan
or serve a common purpose." Id. In all of these cases, the court interpreted uniformity to allow for
local variations caused by discretionary millage levies. See Gindl v. Department of Educ., 396 So.
2d 1105, 1106-07 (Fla. 1979); School Bd. of Escambia County, 353 So. 2d at 838; Penn v.
Pensacola-Escambia Govt. Center Auth., 311 So. 2d 97, 102-04(Fla. 1975); see also Staros, supra
note 59, at 508-10 (discussing these uniformity cases).
117. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991).
118. See id. at641.
119. Id. at 640.
120. See id. at 641. The Court explained:
The Florida Constitution only requires that a system be provided that gives every
student an equal chance to achieve basic educational goals prescribed by the
legislature. The constitutional mandate is not that every school district in the state
must receive equal funding nor that each educational program must be equivalent.
Inherent inequities, such as varying revenues because of higher or lower property
values or difference in millage assessments, will always favor or disfavor some
districts.
Id. The court also found that the impact fee in question could not be collected until it was imposed
within municipalities in the county to ensure that the funds spent would benefit those who were
subjected to the fee. See iL at 637-39 (citing Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329
So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976)).
General education goals set by the Florida Legislature are found in Section 229.591, Florida
Statutes. These eight goals include:
(a) Readiness to start school.-Communities and schools collaborate in a
statewide comprehensive school readiness program to prepare children and
families for children's success in school.
(b) Graduation rate and readiness for postsecondary education and
employment.-Students graduate and are prepared to enter the workforce and
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Two years later the Court revisited the uniform system requirement
in Department of Education v. Glasser.12 ' Glasser involved an attempt by
a school board to increase their discretionary ad valorem taxes without
postsecondary education.
(c) Student performance.-Students make annual learning gains sufficient to
acquire the knowledge, skills, and competencies needed to master state
standards; successfully compete at the highest levels nationally and
internationally; and be prepared to make well-reasoned, thoughtful, and
healthy lifelong decisions.
(d) Learning environment.-School boards provide a learning environment
conducive to teaching and learning, in which education programs are based
on student performance data, and which strive to eliminate achievement gaps
by improving the learning of all students.
(e) School safety and environment.-Communities and schools provide an
environment that is drug-free and protects students' health, safety, and civil
rights.
(f) Teachers and staff.-The schools, district, all postsecondary institutions, and
state work collaboratively to provide professional teachers and staff who
possess the competencies and demonstrate the performance needed to
maximize learning among all students.
(g) Adult literacy.-Adult Floridians are literate and have the knowledge and
skills needed to compete in a global economy, prepare their children for
success in school, and exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.
(h) Parentalfamilyandcommunity involvement.-Communities, school boards,
and schools provide opportunities for involving parents, families, guardians,
and other community stakeholders as collaborative partners in achieving
school improvement and education accountability.
1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-398, § 9 (amending FLA. STAT. § 229.591(3) (1997)). Similar provisions are
contained in the Education component of the State Comprehensive Plan. See FLA. STAT. §
187.201(1). Likewise, the Department of Education, in the Sunshine State Standards, has set
specific standards for what students should know at PK-2nd grade, 3rd-5th grades, 6th-8th grades,
and high school in subject areas including language arts; mathematics; science; social studies; the
arts; health and physical education; and foreign languages. See FLA. STAT. § 229,57 (authorizing
the State Board of Education to approve these standards); FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 6A-1.09401
(adopting the Sunshine State Standards) & R. 6A-1.0941 (adopting minimum student performance
standards). These standards are available at <http://www.fim.edu/doe/curric/prekl2frame2.htm>.
Florida generally receives high marks for its academic standards and assessments compared with
other states. See Quality Counts '99, EDUCATION WEEK, Jan. 11, 1999, at 114 (giving Florida an
"A-" in its standards, assessments and accountability). The Florida Comprehensive Assessment
Test, since 1998, has tracked performance of elementary, middle and high school students on these
standards. See FLA. STAT. § 229.57(3)(c)(3).
121. 622 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1993).
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legislative authorization. 22 The Court found that the school board violated
Article VII, Section 9(a), Florida Constitution, which requires legislative
authorization for the imposition of new taxes."2 3 The Court also rejected
arguments that its decision in Northeast Florida Builders allowed school
boards to provide any level of support as long as legislatively adopted
education goals were met." In support of the Florida Education Finance
Program, the Court added:
The right to education is basic in a democracy. Without it,
neither the student nor the state has a future. Our legislature
annually implements a complicated formula to fund this basic
right. We find that the legislation at issue here, which is part
of the overall funding formula, is in harmony with the Florida
Constitution. 25
The result of these two decisions, according to Justice Kogan, concurring
specially in Glasser, is that:
Florida law now is clear that the uniformity clause will not be
construed as tightly restrictive, but merely as establishing a
larger framework in which a broad degree of variation is
possible.... [V]ariance from county to county is permissible
so long as no district suffers a disadvantage in the basic
educational opportunities available to its students, as
compared to the basic educational opportunities available to
students of other Florida districts.26
The uniformity requirement of Article IX, Section 1, thus does not require
public schools to deliver equal service to each student or to spend equally.
Rather, because "uniform" has been defined as a "common plan or
purpose," the duty to each student is a substantially equal chance at an
education.
122. See id. at 946-47. The legislature had set the maximum amount of discretionary millage
that school districts could levy under the FEFP. See id. at 948 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 236.25
(1989)).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 947. The court stated that it was not required to explicitly define "an uniform
system of free public schools," but that this was for the legislature to do. Id.
125. Id. at 948-49 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 950 (Kogan, J., concurring). Justice Kogan went on to state that differences among
districts in the ability to offer "Latin or painting classes" would not create "lack of uniformity," but
the inability of a district to fund any language or mathematics classes would indeed amount to lack
of uniformity. Id. at 951 (Kogan, J., concurring) ("The Legislature cannot allow students in one
district to be deprived of basic educational opportunities while students in other districts do not
suffer the same.").
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The Florida Education Finance Program,' 27 which provides for state
education funds in addition to the funds raised by school boards through
local ad valorem property taxes, has been a visible success at delivering
uniform education funding to Florida's sixty-seven school districts. 12
Florida generally receives high marks for the equity of its education
system. 129 This may in part account for the relative paucity of litigation
related to equity or "uniformity," and for the absence of Florida from the
so-called "second wave" of education litigation. 30 A finding of
constitutional uniformity does not necessarily mean that the system is good
because, in fact, a uniformly poor system would be constitutional under
this provision.'31 However, the rise of "adequacy" litigation in other states
prompted Florida education reformers to address this issue of the quality
of education provided by the system through litigation.
In Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v.
Chiles, 3 2 the Florida Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the overall
adequacy of the public school system, upholding dismissal of a suit by
students, parents, and school boards against the Governor and other state
officials.' The plaintiffs sought a declaratoryjudgment that a fundamental
right to an adequate education existed under Article IX, Section 1 which
the state had violated by failing to provide sufficient resources to public
education. 134
127. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text (describing the FEFP program).
128. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing Florida's education spending
and comparison to other states).
129. For example, "Education Week" recently gave Florida a'"" in equity based on 1994-95
education data, finding only a 7.6% relative per pupil spending inequity among Florida school
districts. See Quality Counts '99, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 11, 1999, at 137. Only Hawaii (which has but
one statewide school district), West Virginia, and Delaware score better than Florida in the overall
equity of their public education systems. Id. at 120; see also THOMAS B. PARRISH & CHRISTINE S.
HIKIDO, INEQUALITIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUES 101 (Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics,
NCES 98-210, 1998) (ranking Florida with Nevada, West Virginia, Delaware, and North Carolina
in the highest quartile among the states for all measures of educational equity based on relative
purchasing power).
130. See supra notes 17-43 and accompanying text (discussing the waves of education finance
litigation).
131. Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 151 (Ala. 1993) ("It would, of course, be
possible for the state to offer plaintiffs equal educational opportunity but still offer them virtually
no opportunity at all.").
132. 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996); see also E. John Wagner, Comment, Florida Constitutional
Law: What Is theLegislature'sDuy to Provideforthe State's Educational System, 49 FLA. L. REV.
339 (1997).
133. See Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 402.
134. See id. The Supreme Court of Florida did find that declaratory action was proper, and that
individual plaintiffs as citizens and taxpayers, and the school boards, had standing to sue even
absent showing of some special injury. See id. at 402-03 (citing Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E
& F, 589 So. 2d 260,262 n.5 (Fla. 1991); Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717,
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The three-judge plurality135 of the Court in Coalition for Adequacy
found that "adequacy" had no "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards," and decided that the issue of "adequacy" was a nonjusticiable
political question which, under the separation of powers, properlybelonged
to the legislature. 136 A majority of the Court also rejected the idea of a
fundamental right to an education under the Florida Constitution.' 37
However, of critical importance is the conclusion of a majority of justices
720 (Fla. 1994), cert. deniedsub nom. Adams v. Dickinson, 515 U.S. 1158 (1995)). The court did
question the standing of the coalition itself. See id. at 403 n.4.
135. See id. at 408 (Grimes, Harding, and Wells, JJ., concurring). Justice Overton also
concurred with the judgment of the Court. See id. at 408-10 (Overton, J., concurring). Justices
Anstead and Shaw and Chief Justice Kogan dissented. See id. at 410-11 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
136. Id at 407-08 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,209-17 (1962)). The court noted that
at least two of the six criteria established by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine the existence of
a nonjusticiable political question were present with regard to education. See id. at 408.
The Baker Court linked the political question issue to the separation of powers. The Baker
criteria include, the following:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,236-37 (1993); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,516-17 (1969). According to the Court in Coalition forAdequacy, the
Florida Constitution commits the determination of adequacy to the legislature, and no "judicially
discoverable and manageable standards" exist to determine adequacy. 680 So. 2d at 408. The
plurality accepted appellees' arguments contrasting "adequacy," which has no such standards, with
"uniformity," which "has manageable standards because by definition this word means a lack of
substantial variation." Id.; see supra note 54 and accompanying text (courts in at least four states
have taken similar positions and refused to adjudicate adequacy on political question grounds).
137. See Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 402. Only Justice Overton, writing of the
importance of educated citizens to a functioning democracy, recognized a fundamental right to an
education. See id. at 410 (Overton, J., concurring). The dissenting justices contented themselves
with recognizing the importance of education as a "fundamental value" of our society. See id.
(Anstead, J., dissenting) (also noting that the requirement in the Constitution mandating "adequate
provision" goes beyond mere statement of a value).
However, the linkage by Justice Overton of a claim for inadequacy with a showing of drastic
systemic failure, such as the thirty percent illiteracy rate, suggests that he may not have used the
term "fundamental ight' in its usual sense of an individual right. See id. at 410 (Overton, J.,
concurring); cf Wagner, supra note 132, at 349 (criticizing Justice Overton for failing to consider
the education system's role as it affects individual students).
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
that Article IX created a duty for the Legislature to provide some minimal
level of support for public education, and that this duty was enforceable by
the courts. 138 Four justices agreed that certain allegations would give rise
to a justiciable claim of action under Article IX, Section 1.139
The narrow division of the Supreme Court in CoalitionforAdequacy,
with Justice Overton voting with the three-judge plurality, though writing
much that agreed with the dissent,"4 offered clear encouragement to those
who pushed education finance reform.'41 Indeed, the dissent seemed to
invite another suit by plaintiffs or others who could make the allegations
which would respond to Justice Overton's thirty-percent illiteracy
standard. 42 One commentator saw room for success in future education
suits challenging specific legislative enactments, noting that this would
offer the court an opportunity to fashion adequacy standards to guide the
legislature.143
In an interesting postscript to CoalitionforAdequacy, an organization
called the Coalition to Reclaim Education's Share proposed an initiative
amendment to the Florida Constitution in 1997. The Requirement for
Adequate Public Education Funding initiative would have offered a very
138. See CoalitionforAdequacy, 680 So. 2d at409-10 (Overton, J., concurring); id. at410-11
(Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, C.J. and Shaw, J., dissenting).
139. See id. at 409-10 (Overton, J., concurring). Justice Overton wrote:
While 'adequate' may be difficult to quantify, certainly a minimum threshold
exists below which the funding provided by the legislature would be considered
'inadequate.' For example, were a complaint to assert that a county in this state
has a thirty-percent illiteracy rate, I would suggest that such a complaint has at
least stated a cause of action under our education provision. To say otherwise
would have the effect of eliminating the education provision from our constitution
Id. at 409 (Overton, J., concurring). The dissenting justices agreed with Justice Overton that a
thirty-percent illiteracy rate would violate the adequacy provision of the Constitution. See id. at 410
(Anstead, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 409-10 (Overton, J., concurring).
141. See Michael L. Buckner, The Adequacy Provision of the Florida Constitution: The Next
StepAfterCoalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 71 FLA. B.J., Oct.
1997, at 24,28-30.
142. See Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 410 n.10 (Anstead, J., dissenting) ("The
appellants, of course, have the option of filing another action if they can allege and demonstrate
inadequacies sufficient to meet the requirements set out in the various opinions of the judges of the
Court filed in this case.").
143. See Buckner, supra note 141, at 27-30. Such challenges to specific legislative enactments
would avoid another of the plurality's criticisms in Coalition for Adequacy, i.e. that in not
challenging more specific legislative acts or appropriations, the plaintiffs were in reality asking for
a prohibited advisory opinion. See CoalitionforAdequacy, 680 So. 2d at 407 (citing May v. Holley,
59 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1952)).
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specific definition to "adequate provision" in Article IX, Section 1,
requiring state education funding to equal a minimum of forty percent of
appropriations. 1" The forty percent figure was the historic proportion of
the state budget spent on education prior to adoption of the state lottery in
1986.45 The Supreme Court invalidated the initiative, finding that the use
of a fixed, mandatory percentage constituted a violation of the single
subject requirement of Article XI, Section 3.146
V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF REVISION 6
A. Public Proposals Related to Education
Upon appointment in the summer of 1997,147 the Constitution
Revision Commission held thirteen public hearings throughout Florida to
hear the views of Florida citizens and receive their suggestions for changes
to the state constitution. 148 Of the more than 300 separate proposals
144. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Requirement for Adequate Pub. Educ.
Funding, 703 So. 2d 446,447-48 (Fla. 1997).
145. See id. at 447. Although total distributions by the Florida lottery to the Department of
Education amounted to some $793.1 million in 1996-97, education-related appropriations declined
fromover40% in 1985-86, priorto adoption ofthelottery, to 31% in 1995-96 and 33% in 1996-97.
See Office of Planning and Budgeting, Ten Year Summary of Appropriations Data; cf Susan A.
MacManus, Financing Government, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN FLORIDA 208 (Robert J.
Huckshorn, ed., 2d ed., 1998) (pointing out that education as a share of state expenditures fell from
34% in 1991 to 26% in 1996). The Governor's office has noted that, through fiscal year 1996-97,
only 9% of the $7.4 billion in lottery proceeds raised by that year had been spent on education-
related purposes. See FLORIDA EXECutvE BUDGET, FY 1999-2000, at 19 (Office of the Governor,
1999). Since that time, school construction programs and scholarship programs have increased the
overall lottery education expenditures, though the scholarships do not benefit K-12 education. See
id.; see supra note 109, and accompanying text (analyzing level of support provided to education
from lottery in 1999-2000).
146. See Advisory Opinion to theAttorney GeneralRe: RequirementforAdequate Pub. Educ.
Funding, 703 So. 2d 446,450 (Fla. 1997) [hereinafterRequirement]. Article XT, Section 3, Florida
Constitution, allows citizens to propose amendments by initiative "provided that, any such revision
or amendment, except for those limiting the power of government to raise revenue, shall embrace
but one subject and matter directly connected therewith." FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. The problem
with this initiative, according to the Court, was the use of a fixed percentage because this
percentage affected every tax dollar raised and spent, and thus would affect many other functions
of government which, according to the court, would be relegated to the remaining 60 percent of
appropriations. See Requirement, 703 So. 2d at 449.
Justice Anstead dissented, noting that the court would have benefitted in Coalition for
Adequacy "if there had been an express statement in the constitution defining 'adequate provision'
to guide us." Id. at 450 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
147. ArticleXI, section 2(a) ofthe FloridaConstitution, provided for appointment of the CRC
within thirty days after adjournment of the 1997 regular session of the legislature. See FLA. CONST.
art. XI, § 2(a).
148. See, e.g. Randolph Pendleton, Panel Hears Constitution Concerns, FLA. TIMES-UNION,
200
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
received by the CRC, many related to education.149 These included such
issues as requests both to increase and to limit education funding, to
provide school vouchers, to ensure school choice, to return to the 1868
Constitution's "paramount duty" language, as well as to provide free
community college education to Florida students.150 Meeting together on
September 25, 1997, the Commission decided which of the public
proposals should receive further consideration by the CRC.1 51 Again, on
October 20, 1997,52 the Constitution Revision Commission considered
other public proposals, including a proposal to make education a
fundamental right,'53 and another proposal to constitutionalize a base
funding formula for education spending.'5
The'concerns raised by the public were reflected and supplemented
by the formal proposals submitted by the various commissioners. 15 Of the
July 30, 1997, at BI; Howard Troxler, Line Forms Here for Democracy in Florida, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMS, Sept. 12, 1997, at lB.
149. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 54-55.
150. See id.
151. See id. The Commission first voted to refer three general education-related issues for
further consideration: (1) splitting counties into multiple school districts; (2) bonding and taxing
authority of school boards; and (3) the reformation of the State Board of Education. See id. at 54.
Neither of the above three issues is significant for this discussion, but several specific public
proposals did address the adequacy of the public education system in Florida. For example Public
Proposal IX-l-1 would haverequired aspecific appropriation budget for education to bedesignated
in the Constitution. See id. This proposal failed to receive the ten votes required by CRC rules to
proceed for further consideration. See id.; see also CRC JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 35 (also
available at <http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc>) (requiring initial vote of at least 10 Commissioners for
public proposals to receive further consideration); cf. supra text accompanying notes 142-44
(discussing the failed initiative amendment to the Florida Constitution which would have involved
a similar amendment to Article IX, Section 1).
Public Proposal IX-1-2, initially offered by Charles B. Reed, Chancellor of the State University
System, suggested a return to the "paramount duty" language of the 1868 Florida Constitution, as
well as suggesting a free public university system. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 54.
Chancellor Reed's proposal received the necessary ten votes and was filed for later consideration.
See id. Other Public Proposals included Pub. Prop. IX-x-1 (no additional funding for the schools
until underlying problems are solved and students prepared with basic skills); Pub. Prop. IX-x-2
(better discipline in schools); Pub. Prop. IX-x-3 (providing for educational vouchers and school
choice); Pub. Prop. IX-x-3a (another school choice provision); and Pub. Prop. IX-x-5 (funding for
education should equal not less than 25% of amount spent on prisoners). See id. at 54-55. Of these
proposals, only Public Prop. IX-x-3, sponsored by Commissioner Connor, was moved for further
consideration, but failed to receive the necessary ten votes. See id.
152. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 58-87.
153. See id. at 82 (discussing Proposal IX-1-2a). This proposal received the necessary ten
votes and was filed for further consideration. See id.
154. See id. at 83 (discussing Proposal IX-x-8). This public proposal failed to receive the
necessary ten votes. See id.
155. Brief summaries of all formal CRC proposals are found in December 1997-January 1998
CRC Newsletter. See Constitution Revision Commission Proposals Filed, FLA. CONST. REVISION
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187 formal proposals considered by the Constitution Revision
Commission, twenty dealt in some way with public education,156 and ten
directly related either to education funding or substantive educational
quality, as opposed to the general structure and authority of school boards
or the State Board of Education.
B. CRC Education Proposals
Two substantive proposals emerged which promised to address the
questions raised in Coalition for Adequacy"5 7 and better define the state's
duty to make adequate provision for public education. Both proposals
sought to amend Article IX, Section 1 to provide not just aspirational
language, but also to introduce meaningful and measurable standards for
the state's duty to ensure educational adequacy.5 Proposal 157, introduced
by Commissioner Jon Mills, one of the authors of this Article, originally
made education a fundamental right for Florida citizens, and defined
"adequate provision" as "the provision of financial resources, to achieve
a thorough, efficient, high-quality, safe, and secure system of public
education for all public schools and access to public institutions of higher
COMM'NREVISIONWATcH, Dec. 1997-Jan. 1998, at5-11 [hereinafter CRCNEWSLErrER]. Unlike
public proposals, the proposals of commissioners did not have to be approved by an initial vote of
at least ten of the 37 commissioners. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing Rule 3.35).
The CRC initially considered formal proposals, referring these to the proper committee. See id. at
58-61, 88-89, 92-94.
156. Proposals involving article IX included CRC Props. 22 (Rundle) (relating to two years
college free to students); 28 (Riley) (relating to appointed district school superintendents); 40
(Marshall) (subdividing counties into multiple school districts); 54 (Zack) (defining adequate
education funding as 40% of total appropriations); I1I (Mills) (making education a fundamental
right); C/S for Prop. 116 (Corr & Educ. Comm.) (creating an education scholarship fund); 117
(Corr) (membership of State Bd. of Educ.); 119 (Corr) (eligibility requirements for receiving state
school funds); 139 (Mathis) (abolishing elected school board members); 140 (Mathis) (free public
schools and universities); C/S for Prop. 157 (Mills & Educ. Comm.) (defining "adequate
provision"); 158 (Marshall) (nonpartisan school board elections); C/S forProp. 166 (Riley & Educ.
Comm.) (appointed State Bd. of Educ. & appointed Comm'r of Educ.); 181 (Brochin) (state duties
to provide adequate education). See CRC NEWSLETTER, at 5-11. All CRC proposals are also
available at <http://www.law.fsu.edulcrc>. Furthermore, other proposals relating to elections or to
taxation and finance also implicated public education.
157. See supra notes 131-42, and accompanying text (discussing Coalition forAdequacy).
158. The stated intention of both proposals was to raise Florida from a Category II to a
Category IV state in the level of duty to provide for education. See FLORIDA CRC MEETiNG
PROCEEDINGS, Jan. 15, 1998, at 278-80 (Statement of Commissioner Brochin) [hereinafter CRC
MINUTES]; supra text accompanying notes 80-108 (discussing the categorization of education
clauses); CRC MINUTES, Feb. 26, 1998, at 68-72 (Statement of Commissioner Brochin) (the
intention of Prop. 181 was to move Florida's education clause "where it rightfully belongs as a
category four, the highest category, meaning it demands the highest responsibility of this state to
provide the education for all of our children").
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learning or education."'5 9 An amendment to Proposal 157 removed the
specific linkage of adequacy to "the provision of financial resources.'160
Proposal 181, introduced by Commissioner Robert Brochin, also declared
primary and secondary education to be a fundamental right.161 Proposal
159. 2 FLORIDA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, SPECIAL ORDER PACKET, WEEK OF
JANUARY 12-16, 1998, Proposal 157 [hereinafter CRC Proposal 157]. CRC Proposal 157, as
originally drafted, would have amended Article IX, Section 1, as follows:
SECTION 1. System of public education.
(a) Residents of this state have a fundamental right to an
adeouate system of nublic education, Adequate provision shall
be made by law for a uniform system of free public schools and
for the establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions
of higher learning and other public education programs that the
needs of the people may require.
(b) As used in this section. the term "adequate provision" means
the provision of financial resources to achieve a thorough,
efficient high-quality, safe, and secure system of public
education for all public schools and access to public institutions
of higher learning or education. This section shall be self-
executing.
Id. CRC Prop. 157 was quickly amended to remove the clause making the provision self-executing.
See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 140.
On March 17, 1998, the CRC considered an amendment which would have added further
purpose language to Prop. 157. See id. at 217. The amendment would have defined adequate
provision to mean "an efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of public education for the
purpose of allowing students to achieve a high quality education that prepares students to
participate in a democratic society and to successfully compete in a global economy." Id.; cf. FLA.
STAT. § 229.591(3) (1999) (Florida's comparable education standards); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (comparable aspirational adequacy definition);
Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,409 (Fla. 1996)
(Overton, J., concurring) (stressing importance of education to democratic society). Ultimately, the
additional aspirational language was removed from Prop. 157 after some commissioners expressed
a concern with the explicit outcome-based link in the amendment. See CRC JOURNAL, Mar. 17,
1999, at 218; CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Mar. 17, 1998, at 234-35 (Statement of
Commissioner Evans).
160. CRC JOURNAL, supra note I, at 140.; see also CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Jan. 13,
1998, at 167 (Statement of Commissioner Dexter Douglass).
161. See 5 FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N, SPECIALORDER PACKET, WEEK OPJANUARY 12-
16,1998, Proposal 181 [hereinafter CRC Proposal 181]. CRC Proposal 181, as originally drafted,
would have amended article IX, section 1, as follows:
SECTION 1. Systemta Public education.
Each resident of this state has a fundamental right to a public
education durine the primary and secondary years of study, and
it is the paramount duty of the state to ensure that such education
is complete and adequate, Ample dequate provision shall be
made by law for a uniform system of free public schools and for
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181, using the language of the 1868 Constitution, 62 declared education to
be the "paramount duty of the state," and required the state to make "ample
provision" for the system of public education. 63 In his introduction,
Commissioner Brochin made explicit reference to the higher standards
included in the 1868 Florida Constitution."M The reference to "ample
the establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of
higher learning and other public education programs that the
needs of the people may require.
L; cf Department of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944,948 (Fla. 1993) ("The right to education
is basic in a democracy.").
162. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96 (discussing the Florida Constitution of 1868).
163. CRC Proposal 181. This wording, taken from the 1868 Florida Constitution, is also very
similar to the current Washington constitutional provision. See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see
supra text accompanying notes 74-75 (discussing this Category IV provision). The Washington
Supreme Court, examining that provision, has found that it"does not merely seek to broadly declare
policy, explain goals, or designate objectives to be accomplished. It is declarative of a
constitutionally imposed duty." Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (Wash. 1978) (en
bane) (concluding that the provision was not directed only at the legislature, but could also be
enforced by the courts). The Washington court explained that "'paramount' is not merely a
synonym of 'important.' Rather, it means superior in rank, above all others, chief, preeminent,
supreme, and, in fact, dominant." Id. at 91. The court also held:
By imposing upon the State a paramount duty to make ample provision for the
education of all children residing within the State's borders, the constitution has
created a "duty" that is supreme, preeminent or dominant. Flowing from this
constitutionally imposed "duty" is its jural correlative, a correspondent "right"
permitting control of another's conduct. Therefore, all children residing within the
borders of the State possess a "right," arising from the constitutionally imposed
"duty" of the State, to have the State make ample provision for their education.
Further, since the "duty" is characterized as paramount the correlative "right" has
equal stature.
Id. Under this provision, the state had the obligation to provide "fully sufficient funds" for the
schools "as a first priority." Id. at 95 (noting that these funds had also to be drawn from dependable
and regular tax sources).
164. See CRCMINUTES, supra note 158, Jan. 15,1998, at263-64 (StatementofCommissioner
Brochin). Noting the similarities between his proposal and the education clause of the 1868
Constitution, Commissioner Brochin declared:
[This proposal] comes out of our Constitution of 1868. And although I didn't use
the exact language, I used language fairly close. And what the 1868 Constitution
says is that it is the paramount duty of the state to ensure that children, and they
use the word children, have a right to an education without distinction or
preference. And this is modeled after that. It was a good idea in 1868 and it is
even a better idea in 1998.
Id.; see also CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Feb. 26, 1998, at 66-67 (Statement of Commissioner
Brochin) (linking Prop. 181 to the 1868 Constitution).
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provision" was removed, however, and the "adequate provision"
requirement of Article IX, Section 1 was retained. 6
Much debate centered on the use of the term "fundamental right" in
both Proposals 157 and 181.V66 Ultimately this language was removed from
both proposals. 67 Many commissioners and others feared that the term
"fundamental right" would place too severe a burden on school districts
and the state, and might ultimately make their actions subject to strict
judicial scrutiny with regard to litigation by individuals.1 68 Commissioners
165. See CRCJOURNAL, supra note 1, at 148-49; see also CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Jan.
15, 1998, at 265-67 (discussion between Commissioners Sundberg and Brochin on the retention
of the word "adequate" for the sake of consistency, in light of the earlier introduction of Prop. 157
defining "adequate provision").
166. See supra notes 159 and 161 (detailing Proposals 157 and 181). Interestingly, though no
state constitution declares education to be a fundamental right, courts in at least fifteen states have
interpreted their education provisions to provide such a right. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.
2d 107, 156-57 (Ala. 1993); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 590-92 (Ariz. 1973); Serrano II,
557 P.2d at 950-51; Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,373 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299,302 (Minn. 1993);
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d 684, 689 (Mont. 1989); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1358 (N.H. 1997) (duty of state creates a corresponding fundamental
right "to the beneficiaries of the duty"); Robinson 11, 351 A.2d at 720; Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d
249, 261 (N.C. 1997) (right to "sound basic education," but not a right to absolute equality of
educational opportunities); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist No. 1 v. State., 511 N.W.2d 247, 250 (N.D.
1994); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ohio 1979); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585
P.2d at 94; Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County School Dist.
No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d310, 332 (Wyo.), cert. denied sub. nom Hot Springs County Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1,449 U.S. 8224 (1980). But see Archer v. State, 851
S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tenn. 1993) (stressing the importance of education, but choosing not to define
the right to education under the Tennessee Constitution as "fundamental"); Doe v. Superintendent
of Schs. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095-96 (Mass. 1995) (citing McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at
516) (noting that no "fundamental right" to education exists in Massachusetts, and that strict
scrutiny is not required in a school discipline case); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384,390 (Vt. 1997)
(stressing importance of education right, but finding fundamental right declaration unnecessary);
see also Florida Dept. of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944,948-49 (Fla. 1993).
A recent West Virginia case upheld local school district discipline procedures under strict
scrutiny examination. See Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340,348 (W.
Va. 1997). However, the West Virginia court found that the state had an obligation to provide
alternative education opportunities to suspended students in all but the most exceptional
circumstances. See id. at 350-51.
In an Opinion on a proposed initiative amendment, the Nebraska Attorney General warned of
possible effects of creating an explicit "fundamental right" to education in that state. See Neb. Op.
Att'y Gen. 95095, at 627. The attorney general warned that it had serious legal consequences, and
that "[a]ny legislation affecting that right would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. The
Nebraska amendment was subsequently rejected by voters. See supra text accompanying notes 88-
90.
167. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 207.
168. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. REVISIONCOMM'N, SPECIALORDERPACKET,WEEKOFJAN. 12-16,
1998, Proposals 157 & 181; see also United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
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also feared that the proposal might be interpreted as creating a cause of
action for failing to meet the particular education needs of individuals, as
compared with the systemwide responsibility intended by Article IX,
Section 1.169 Responding to these concerns, Commissioner Brochin
proposed an amendment to Proposal 181, making education "the
fundamental value," instead of a fundamental right. 70 Commissioner Corr
(1938) (noting that government actions affecting fundamental rights receive the most heightened
scrutiny of the courts); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla.
1985) (compelling interest standard appropriate when a fundamental right is implicated by
government action).
169. See CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Jan. 15, 1998, at 282 (Statement of Commissioner
Riley); id. at 284-85 (Statement of Commissioner Marshall); id. at 285-87 (Statement of
Commissioner Langley). Commissioner Marshall discussed the "horror scenario" in Kansas City,
Missouri, of a federal judge taking control of a school system and compelling taxation and
spending. See id. at 284 (Statement of Commissioner Marshall); cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S.
70, 82 (1995) (discussing fact that, despite large investments in Kansas City schools, students
outcomes were "at or below national norms at many grade levels"); see also Mark Walsh,
Achievement Standard at Issue in Kansas City Case, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 11, 1995, at 18 (discussing
the Kansas City case, and noting that over $1.3 billion in forced spending and capital improvements
have failed to produce more than "modest improvements in student achievement").
In another discussion, Commissioner Riley, noting that a fundamental right triggered the
compelling government interest test, inquired as to whether the state had such a compelling interest,
and if so, why it should not be clearly stated in the Constitution. See CRC MINUTES, supra note
158, Jan. 15, 1998, at 288 (Statement of Commissioner Riley). Responding to this question,
Commissioner Langley stated:
If you want to turn the funding of education to the courts, do it, that is what that
would do. I don't want to do that. I would rather go fuss at my Senator or
Representative or whatever rather than depend on some judge who is never going
to answer to me and come back with a court-ordered taxation, that's got to be the
worst kind.
Id. at 289 (Statement of Commissioner Langley); cf. CRCMINUTES, supra note 158, Feb. 26,1998,
at 81 (Statement of Commissioner Connor) (warning ofthe "Pandora's box" of possible litigation).
170. See id. at 65-66 (Statement of Commissioner Brochin). Commissioner Brochin stated:
I sensed a concern, and on further reading and discussion of the subject was
concerned that it would create perhaps litigation in the area of special needs by
people coming forward, as Commissioner Corr alluded to earlier, and claiming
individual rights fundamentally had been violated, and therefore, people with
special needs and juveniles, perhaps in juvenile detention centers, would bring
forth claims that their fundamental right to an education had been violated. That
was not the intent, initially, and that is not the intent today.
Id. at 65. Again, Commissioner Brochin stated, "It is a collective purpose, it is not an individual
purpose, it's not there to allow individual students to claim reparations, it's not there to allow
individual or potential students to claim that their rights have been deprived. It is there to put the
burden on our government to take education... to a much higher level." Id. at 67-68.
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then proposed a substitute amendment making education "a fundamental
value" (not "the fundamental value"), and this was adopted by the
Commission. 171 Having rejected the earlier "fundamental right" language,
the wording now echoes Justice Anstead's dissent in Coalition for
Adequacy, when he wrote:
Surely all would agree that education is a fundamental value
in our society. The question remains as to how we have
recognized that value in Florida. The most obvious and
effective way to recognize a value as fundamental and of the
highest importance is to make provision for that value in our
society's supreme and basic charter, our constitution. We did
that in Florida. The people of Florida recognized the
fundamental value of education by making express provision
for education in our constitution. 112
This amendment, making education a "fundamental value of the people"
of Florida, 173 instead of a fundamental individual right, emphasizes that the
focus of Article IX is the public education system, and the adequacy of that
system in general. Furthermore, the addition of the high quality language
more specifically responds to Justice Anstead's comments. The result was
to specify a higher standard for the system.
In the debates surrounding Proposals 157 and 181, no commissioner
ever expressed an intent or desire to restrict the standing of citizen-
taxpayers to challenge the taxing and spending decisions of the legislature
in funding the public education system. 74 Commissioners were concerned
with the possibility of challenges by individuals for failures to meet
specific individual needs in specific instances, or for disciplining
individuals, and with the level of scrutiny the courts would apply to these
cases.175 Even after the change from "fundamental right" to "fundamental
value," the new education provision would seem to leave intact the
standing rule of Coalition for Adequacy with regard to system-wide
171. See CRCJouRNAL, supra note 1, at 207; CRC MNUTES, supra note 158, Feb. 26, 1998,
at 80-81 (Statement of Commissioner Corr). Likewise, the term "the paramount duty" in Proposal
181 was amended to "a paramount duty." See id. at 207; id. at 81 (Statement of Commissioner
Corr); id. at 69-70 (Statement of Commissioner Connor) (worrying that if education were "the
paramount" duty, other important state functions such as public safety, law enforcement, might be
shortchanged).
172. CoalitionforAdequacy, 680 So. 2d at 410 (Anstead,J., dissenting); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202,221 (1982) ("Education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.");
Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 726 ("there can be no dispute that education of our children is an
essential Texas value").
173. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1999).
174. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing standing).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 166-71.
[Vol. 52
PUBLIC EDUCATION: REWSION 6
challenges by citizens. 176 Nothing that the CRC said or did could rationally
be construed to reduce access to legal remedies since the Commission
itself contemplated court intervention to enforce constitutional standards. 177
Both Proposal 157 and 181 were adopted by the Constitution
Revision Commission by overwhelming votes.171 Presented together to the
Commission, the education revision was finally approved on March 23,
1998, by a 28-7 vote of the Commission. 179 In the November 1998 general
election, Revision 6 received the votes of over seventy percent of Florida
voters,180 and became part of the Constitution in January 1999.
C. Interpreting New Constitutional Provisions
Changes to the Florida Constitution are always significant. When the
language of the constitution is altered or amended, courts have presumed
that such changes are intentional, and that a different effect is intended
from prior language.181 When interpreting a new constitutional provision,
Florida courts have stated that their duty is to discern and give effect to the
will of the voters who adopted the provision.8 Also, courts should keep
in view the objective to be accomplished and the evils to be remedied by
the constitutional provision, and so interpret the constitution as to
accomplish rather than to defeat that objective.8 3 Courts look to the
legislative history of the provision and statements by the drafters and
176. See Coalition forAdequacy, 680 So. 2d at 403.
177. See, e.g., CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Feb. 26, 1998, at 67 (statement of
Commissioner Brochin); id., Jan. 15, 1998, at 300 (statement of Commissioner Brochin); id., Jan.
13, 1998, at 148, 150 (statement of Commissioner Mills).
178. See CRC JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 216-17. CRC Proposal 157 was adopted by a 28-2
vote, while Proposal 181 was approved by a 28-1 vote of the CRC. See id. Both approved
provisions were combined by the Style and Drafting Committee and submitted to the full CRC with
a proposed Ballot Summary as Revision 2 on March 23, 1998. See id. at 226.
179. See id. at 226. The Secretary of State subsequently placed Revision 2 on the November
1998 ballot as Revision 6 because the nine CRC proposals followed four legislatively proposed
constitutional amendments on the November 1998 ballot.
180. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., State v. Creighton, 469 So. 2d 735,739 (Fla. 1985); Williams v. Smith, 360 So.
2d 417,419 (Fla. 1978); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 112 So. 2d 843, 847 (Fla. 1959).
182. See Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979) (discussing interpretation of
Florida's new Ethics in Government Amendment); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243
So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel McKay v. Keller, 191 So. 542,545-46 (Fla. 1939). See
generally 1 THoMAS COOLEY, CONSTrUTIONALLIMrrATiONS 165-72 (8th ed. 1927).
183. See State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson, 230 So. 2d 130, 135 (Fla. 1970); Gray v.
Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846,851-52 (Fla. 1960); Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 2d 308,315-16 (Fla. 1930)
("The object of constitutional construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention and purpose
of the people in adopting it. That intention and purpose is the 'spirit' of the Constitution-as
obligatory as its written word.").
20001
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adopters in interpreting a constitutional provision.M8
In interpreting the provision, courts presume that the words have their
"most usual and obvious meaning, unless the text suggests that they have
been used in a technical sense.""1 5 A dictionary may supply this commonly
understood meaning, and is often referred to by courts.8 6 The Florida
Supreme Court, in an Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 7 further
described the method of construing a new constitutional provision, stating
that "the words should be given reasonable meanings according to the
subject matter, but in the framework of contemporary societal needs and
structure. Such light maybe gained from historical precedent, from present
facts, or from common sense."' 8  Furthermore, new constitutional
provisions "must be viewed in light of the historical development of the
decisional law extant at the time of... adoption and the intent of the
framers and adopters."' 89
D. Explanation of the CRC Education Revision
Revision 6 does three things. First, it emphasizes the importance of
education to the people of Florida, declaring it to be a fundamental value.
Second, it clarifies the state's duty to adequately provide for education as
"paramount." Finally it defines what is meant by "adequate provision." To
184. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Parii-Mutual Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
1995). In Winfield, the Florida Supreme Court considered the recently adopted Privacy
Amendment, Article I, Section 23, Florida Constitution ("Every natural person has the right to be
let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise
provided herein."). l at 544. The court, looking into the legislative history behind this proposal,
noted that the drafters had rejected such terms as "unreasonable" or "unwarranted" in modifying
the protection from "governmental intrusion." Id. The conclusion of the court was that the
amendment intended to provide for a greater level of protection from governmental intrusion. Id.
at 548; see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989) (again discussing this intended
greater protection as evidenced by legislative history).
185. City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 151 So. 488, 489-90 (1933) ('rhe
presumption is in favor of the natural and popular meaning in which the words are usually
understood by the people who have adopted them.").
186. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion to the Governor-1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So.
2d 278,282 (Fla. 1997) (citing Myers v. Hawkings, 362 So. 2d 926,930 n.10 (Fla. 1978)).
187. 276 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1973).
188. Id. at 29; see also Burnett v. Department of Corrections, 666 So. 2d 882, 885-86 (Fla.
1996) (citingPlantev. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933,936 (Fla. 1979)) ("Intentis traditionally discerned
from historical precedent, from the present facts, from common sense, and from an examination of
the purpose the provision was intended to accomplish and the evils sought to be prevented.
Furthermore, we may look to the explanatory materials available to the people as a predicate for
their decision as persuasive of their intent.").
189. Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980); see also 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHNE. NOWAK,TREATISEONCONSTITUTIONALLAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.6 (2d ed.
1992) (analyzing the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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be adequate under the revised provision, the public education system must





* high quality, and
* allow students to obtain a high quality education.
Were the system to fail any of the above standards, it would be inadequate.
The plain meaning of the new terms is helpful. "Efficient" is defined by
Webster as "productive of desired effects [especially] productive without
waste."'" Among definitions for "safe" are "freed from harm or risk" and
"affording safety from danger."'191 "Secure" is similar to "safe," with
definitions including "free from danger," "free from risk of loss," and
"affording safety; inviolable."' 92 Finally, "quality" is defined by Webster
as "a degree of excellence; grade" or "superiority in kind."'93 The Oxford
English Dictionary notes that there is an expressed or implied comparison
in "quality" with other things of a like nature.' 94 "High" is used to modify
"quality" to specify further what degree of excellence is required by the
new provision.
Ample legislative history exists to explain the intent of the drafters
of Revision 6, and to explain as well their intent behind the specific words
used in Revision 6, including such terms as "paramount," "efficient,"
"safe," "secure" and "high quality." For example, Commissioner Brochin
explained his intent behind Proposal 181, saying:
The intent, and I do want to be clear on intent, is as follows:
One it is to allow the people of this state, through its
document, that is the Constitution, through its document, that
it has fundamental values, and one of those fundamental
values is the education of its children.' 95
190. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 397 (1985) [hereinafter WEBSTER];
cf. COMPACr EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGUSH DIcTIONARY 835 (1987) (defining "efficient" as
"productive of effects; effective; adequately operative") [hereinafter OXFORD].
191. WEBSTER, supra note 190, at 1036; c. OXFORD, supra note 190, at 2619 (defining "safe"
as: "Ofa place or thing: Affording security or immunity; not exposing to danger; not likely to cause
harm or injury").
192. WEBSTER, supra note 190, at 1062; cf OXFORD, supra note 190, at 2704 ("Of a place:
Affording safety").
193. WEBSTER, supra note 190, at 963.
194. See OXFORD, supra note 190, at 2383 (also defining "quality" as "the degree or grade of
excellence, etc. possessed by a thing").
195. CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Mar. 17, 1998, at 237 (Statement of Commissioner
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Commissioner Brochin went on to explain that a second important
intention was "to allow the people of this state, through the Constitution,
its document, to instruct its state government that its paramount duty is to
provide an adequate . . . education for its children." '196 Finally,
Commissioner Brochin affirmed that Proposal 181 intended to benefit the
education of all of Florida's children."9 The target of Revision 6 is clear:
"all children residing within [Florida's] borders.""19 Such language would
seem to foreclose any attempt to exclude resident non-citizen children from
the public education system should federal jurisprudence in the area
change. '99  Commissioner Brochin concluded, "Proposal 181 is
quintessential constitutional language that sets forth, in clear and
unambiguous terms, the high value of education that we place in our
Constitution."2°
Likewise, intent language is present to better explain Proposal 157's
attempt to define "adequacy." The sponsor of Proposal 157, Commissioner
Mills, explicitly referred to CoalitionforAdequacy,20' noting that Proposal
157 was intended "to define what adequate education should be in the state
of Florida with common terms used in other constitutions."2" Recognizing
the likelihood of future litigation following Coalition for Adequacy,
Commissioner Mills stated that it was important for the Constitution
Revision Commission to provide a definition for adequacy "which would
give guidance to either the legislature or the courts."2 "3 Commissioner
Mills added, "the terms used here are understandable, they are derived...
from other states that have a higher standard, and they give the court and
Brochin).
196. Id. at 237-38 (Statement of Commissioner Brochin).
197. See id. (Statement of CornmissionerBrochin) (speaking of the possible effect of Proposal
181 on vouchers and charter schools).
198. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also CRCMINUTES, supra note 158, Mar. 17,1998, at 231-
34 (Statement of Commissioner Mills about applicability and purpose of Prop. 181 and intent of
K-12 education).
199. Cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220-23 (1982) (striking down a Texas statute which
attempted to exclude children of illegal aliens from public schools, but noting that illegal aliens are
not a suspect class nor is education a fundamental right). The existence of "adequate and
independent state grounds," as with a state constitutional provision, would allow Florida to
continue to provide greater protection even in the event of a reappraisal by federal courts. See
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1034, 1038 (1963).
200. CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Mar. 17, 1998, at 238 (Statement of Commissioner
Brochin).
201. See CoalitionforAdequacy, 680 So. 2d at 400. See supra text accompanying notes 132-
46 (discussing Coalition for Adequacy).
202. CRC MINtES, supra note 158, Jan. 13, 1998, at 147-48 (Statement of Commissioner
Mills).
203. Id. at 148.
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any future legislature an opportunity to meet a standard of adequacy. ',204
A brief examination of the terms used to define "adequate provision"
will further demonstrate the intent of the Constitution Revision
Commission to provide increased specificity. The term "uniform," retained
in Article IX, Section 1, has a long history in Florida,2 5 and the meaning
is unchanged by Revision 6. The stated intention of Revision 6 was to
define "adequacy." As revised, the Florida Constitution now requires the
education system to be "uniformly adequate" and meet the new standards
uniformly.' The state's duty is also defined in terms of making "adequate
provision" for a "system of free public schools."' " The focus of Article IX,
Section 1 is the public school system, not individual schools or students. °9
The state's obligation, accordingly, is to provide for an adequate
204. Id.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 114-33 (discussing the uniformity requirement).
206. See Ballot Summary for Revision 6, in CRC MINUTEs, supra note 158, Mar. 17, 1998,
at 234.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 114-33 (discussing the uniformity requirement).
208. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1999).
209. See CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Feb. 26, 1998, at 57-59 (discussion between
Commissioners Connors and Mills regarding this issue). After affirming that "adequate provision"
modified the system of public schools, and not a particular school, discussion proceeded:
Comm'r Connors: And so if you had a particular school which was neither
efficient or deficient in terms of safety or security or in the
quality of education that it provided, would that necessarily
mean that the system as a whole failed to meet the standard?
Comm'r Mills: No, it wouldn't. There is a good example of this in Justice
Overton's opinion [in Coalition forAdequacy] where he said
... if the entire school system, that is the school board, had a
[30 percent illiteracy] rate, that would be emblematic of an
entire system that was broken.
Comm'r Connors: Then, in response to Commissioner Corr's question about
litigation by parents on behalf of their child in a given school,
for instance where it may have been deemed by them that
adequate provision was not being made, would they be perhaps
less likely to prevail than otherwise because the adequate
provision refers to the system as a whole as opposed to
individuals?
Comm'r Mills: The [term] adequate provision does refer to the system; any
particular school of course would be evidence of that
[unconstitutionally].
Id. Such an issue of localized inadequacy might also violate the uniformity requirement, as well as
the state equal protection guarantee. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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educational system, not necessarily to meet special educational needs of
particular individuals.210
Could the new "efficiency" standard alter Florida's uniformity
requirement and be read to require equality in education funding? Many
other state constitutions contain the phrase "efficient" or "thorough and
efficient," and the words have been examined during the course of many
equity and adequacy suits. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court,
in Pauley v. Kelly,211 defined a "thorough and efficient" school system not
as requiring equal opportunity, but in terms of meeting various specific
substantive educational goals.212 Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
in Abbott 11,213 explained that the "thorough and efficient" clause in New
Jersey's Constitution required "a certain level of educational opportunity,
a minimum level, that will equip the student to become 'a citizen and...
a competitor in the labor market.' ... If, however, that level is reached, the
constitutional mandate is fully satisfied regardless of the fact that some
districts may exceed it. '2 14 The New Jersey Court, however, went on to
find a requirement that education in poor urban school districts be funded
at substantially equal levels as in more affluent suburban districts. 25 The
situation in Florida, however, is different from the situation in New Jersey,
where issues of educational equity have been as important as adequacy
210. See CRCMINUTEs, supra note 158, Feb. 26, 1998, at 67-68 (Statement of Commissioner
Brochin) ("It is a collective purpose, it is not an individual purpose; it's not there to allow
individual students to claim reparations, it's not there to allow individual or potential students to
claim that their rights have been deprived. It is there to put the burden on our government to take
education [from] where it's been to a much higher constitutional level."); id. at 52 (Statement of
Commissioner Mills); see also supra text accompanying notes 166-73 (discussing removal of
"fundamental right" language).
211. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979).
212. See id. at 874. See supra note 43, and accompanying text (providing the standards from
Pauley).
213. See Abbott Hl, 575 A.2d at 359.
214. Id. at 369 (quoting Robinson 1).
215. See id. at 397. There was some criticism of the difference between the court's description
of what the constitutional "thorough and efficient" language meant and the ultimate decision to
require substantial equality. See, e.g., Richard D. Ballot, Note, State Constitutional Law-Public
School Financing-Spending Disparity Between Wealthy School Districts and Poor Urban School
Districts Caused by Reliance on Local Property Taxes is Violative of the "Thorough and Efficient"
Clause, 21 SETONHALLL. REV. 445,477-80 (1991). In Kentucky and Texas cases, courts have also
used language suggesting that "efficiency" has some inherent equality requirement. See Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc, 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) (the constitutionally required
"efficient" system of public schools "mustbe substantiallyuniform throughout the state," providing
every child in the state "with an equal opportunity to have an adequate education"); Edgewood I,
777 S.W.2d at 397 ("efficient" system guarantees "substantially equal access to similar revenues
per pupil at similar levels of tax effort" so that students are "afforded a substantially equal
opportunity to have access to educational funds").
(Vol. 52
PUBLUC EDUCATION: REVISION 6
during the long course of New Jersey education litigation.216 The intention
of the CRC, moreover, was not to modify Florida's already satisfactory
uniformity requirement.217
The second term, "efficient," is used in many other state
constitutions. 2" The recent Ohio case, DeRolph v. State,219 interpreted
Ohio's constitution, which mandates that the state provide for a "thorough
and efficient" education system. The Ohio court upheld a lower court
finding that the legislature had failed in its duty to provide such a
system.' In its decision, the Ohio court relied upon a long factual record
detailing weaknesses in curriculum, numerous examples of dangerous or
inadequate facilities, and a lack of both teaching staff and materials.221
Members of the Constitution Revision Commission were aware of the
Ohio case, and pointed to it both as a warning of what might happen if
school conditions worsened, and an example of the usefulness of better
defining the adequacy requirement.2' The use of the term "efficient" was
also intended to signify that more than money alone is required for an
adequate system.223 Explaining the "efficient system" standard under the
Texas Constitution, the Texas Supreme Court noted, "An efficient system
of public education requires not only classroom instruction, but also the
216. See Erin E. Kelly, Note, All Students Are Not Created Equal: The Inequitable
Combination of Property-Tax-Based School Finance Systems and Local Control, 43 DuKE L.J.
397, 414-21 (1995) (discussing the New Jersey litigation).
217. See CRCMINUTES, supra note 158,Jan. 15,1998, at 292-95 (Statement ofCommissioner
Sundberg) (explaining Florida's more equitable education finance system). Support for this may
come from the recent Leandro case in North Carolina, which interpreted that state's "general and
uniform system" provision. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 249. Accepting plaintiffs' adequacy arguments,
the court rejected a claim that the constitution also included a "right to equal educational
opportunities." Id. at 255-56.
218. See supra notes 67-69, and accompanying text. The word "efficient" is also used in the
Kentucky Constitution, and was given an influential definition by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213. See supra notes 33-44, and accompanying text.
219. 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). DeRolph was especially significant because the decision
came in the spring of 1997, shortly before the Florida CRC was appointed, and shortly after the
very different decision by the Florida Supreme Court in Coalition for Adequacy. See supra text
accompanying notes 132-46 (discussing the Coalition for Adequacy case).
220. See DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 747. Reviewing along list of deficiencies in the Ohio school
system, the court concluded: "All the facts in the record lead to one inescapable
conclusion-Ohio's elementary and secondary schools are neither thorough nor efficient...
Consequently, the present school financing system contravenes the clear wording of the
Constitution and the framers' intent." Il at 745.
221. See id. at 744-45.
222. SeeCRC MINJTE,supranote 158, Jan. 13,1998, at 151-52 (StatementofCommissioner
Mills).
223. See id. at 149 (Statement of Commissioner Mills); cf Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989) (listing qualitative aspects to an "efficient" education
system).
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classrooms where that instruction is to take place. These components of an
efficient system-instruction and facilities-are inseparable., 22
The terms "safe" and "secure," as used in Revision 6, are not meant
to be redundant. The term "safe" applies to health issues related to school
facilities, '  while the issue of "security" involves physical safety, as
against guns and drugs. 6 The use of both terms is intended to provide
increased specificity and broader requirements.
Finally, the term "high quality" is introduced to Article IX, Section
1.227 "High quality" is also a term which appears in other state
constitutions,22 and is often regarded as a hallmark of a Category IV
constitutional provision.229 Nonetheless, the term "high quality" has not
necessarily been an effective tool in education finance lawsuits. The
Illinois Supreme Court, in the recent case Lewis v. Spagnolo,"° again
confronted an adequacy challenge based upon the Illinois Constitution. 31
Article X, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution, a provision which many
commentators consider a Category IV provision, placing the highest duty
224. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 726.
225. See, e.g., CRC Mm=UTES, supra note 158, Jan. 13, 1998, at 150 (Statement of
Commissioner Mills); c DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 744 ("Obviously, state funding of school districts
cannot be considered adequate if the districts lack sufficient funds to provide their students a safe
and healthy learning environment."). The Ohio Court also affirmed:
Although a student's success depends upon numerous factors besides money, we
must ensure that there is enough money that students have the chance to succeed
because of the educational opportunity provided, not in spite of it. Such an
opportunity requires, at the very least, that all of Ohio's children attend schools
which are safe and conducive to learning. At the present, Ohio does not provide
many of its students with even the most basic of educational needs.
Id., at 746.
226. See CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Jan. 13, 1998, at 150 (Statement of Commissioner
Mills). In the meetings of the CRC's education committee, discussion concerning use of the terms
"safe" and "secure" was resolved with "safety" having a connotation of "health issues," while
"security" was linked to a possible dangerous environment like guns in schools. See Florida
Constitution Revision Commission, Hearings of the Educ. Comm., Dec. 11, 1997 (discussion of
CRC Prop. 157, transcript of taped committee hearing available with author); Florida Constitution
Revision Commission, Hearings of ti Style & Drafting Comm., Feb. 2, 1998 (discussion of C/S
for Prop. 157, transcript of taped committee hearing available with author).
227. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1999).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 56-78 (discussing other state constitutions).
229. But see Lewis v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 803-04 (IU1. 1999) (definition of "high
quality" for legislature, not courts); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text (Virginia's
education provision also mandates a "high quality" educational program, despite being ranked as
only Category I1).
230. 710N.E.2d at798.
231. See IU. CONST. art. X, § 1.
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upon the state, 2 reads in full:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services. Education
in public schools through the secondary level shall be free.
There may be such other free education as the General
Assembly provides by law.
The State has the primar responsibility for financing the
system of public education.2
Rejecting both adequacy and equity challenges by students in the deprived
district of East St. Louis,234 the Illinois court found that "questions relating
to the quality of education are solely for the legislative branch to
answer."3 5 The Illinois court noted that "what constitutes a 'high quality'
education cannot be ascertained by any judicially discoverable or
manageable standards and that the constitution provides no principled basis
for a judicial definition of 'high quality.""' 6 The history in Florida,
232. See McUsic, supra note 48, at 334; To Render Them Safe, supra note 69, at 1667-68.
William Thro, however, notes that courts in Category IV states often reject challenges based on
Category IV provisions. See id. at 1668.
233. ILL CONST. art. X, § 1.
234. Lewis, 710 N.E.2d at 816; see also Susan Wishnick & Adam Schwartz, Litigating the
Right to a MinimallyAdequate Education in East St. Louis, Illinois, CLEARINGHOUSEREV., Mar.-
Apr. 1999, at 529.
235. Lewis, 710 N.E.2d at 802 (quoting Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d
1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996)).
236. Id. at 803. The court went on to add:
It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality
courts might develop would actually be derived from the constitution in any
meaningful sense. Nor is education a subject within the judiciary's field of
expertise, such that a judicial role in giving content to the education guarantee
might be warranted. Rather, the question of educational quality is inherently one
of policy involving philosophical and practical considerations that call for the
exercise of legislative and administrative discretion.
To hold that the question of educational quality is subject to judicial
determination would largely deprive the members of the general public of a voice
in a matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois.... [A]n open
and robust public debate is the lifeblood of the political process in our system of
representative democracy. Solutions to problems of educational quality should
emerge from a spirited dialogue between the people of the state and their elected
representatives.
Id. (quoting Committee for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1178); cf. Coalition for Adequacy &
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however, does provide clear standards and demonstrates an intent that
courts be able to enforce the provision.
The second use of the term "high quality" in the new Article IX,
Section 1, is the clause, "that allows students to obtain a high quality
education." The appearance of "high quality" here may help distinguish
Florida from other states which include the term in their constitution. 2 7 It
is also not intended to be redundant. The adequate education system in
Florida must be a system "which allows students to obtain a high quality
education. '238 The second use of "high quality" is a separate, outcome-
based standard.239 In other words, high quality defines the education
received by the students and relates to results as compared to the quality of
the system. A high quality education should not only meet standards set by
the Legislature,' but should also be high quality compared with other
states.241 Thus, Revision 6 is intended to provide for both an input and
outcome-based standard that can be measurable and meaningful in
Florida.242
VI. PROSPECTS FOR EDUCATION FINANCE
REFORM IN FLORIDA
Revision 6, approved by the voters in the November 1998 general
election, became part of the Florida Constitution in January 1999.243 The
CRC, proposing amendments to Article IX, Section 1, intended to provide
specific standards for the state's duty to make "adequate provision" for the
public school system. The standards were provided to assist all branches
of government who may be involved in managing the public schools,
Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,407-08 (Fla. 1996).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 216-24; see also Enrich, supra note 27, at 166-67;
Jensen, supra note 52, at 38-39 (both describing the utility of a constitutional provision which
addresses the quality of the school system in adequacy litigation).
238. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1999).
239. See CRC MaNrE, supra note 158, Jan. 13, 1998, at 207 (discussion between
Commissioners Zack and Mills regarding second use of the term "high quality" as not duplicative
in Prop. 157); cf Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997) (a necessary qualitative
content exists for the state's obligation to make provision for education).
240. See supra note 120, and accompanying text (discussing these legislative goals); cf. St.
Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 635, 641 ((Fla. 1991); Leandro,
488 S.E.2d at 259 (relating educational standards to adequacy).
241. Cf. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212 (stressing the importance of providing an education that
compares favorably with other states).
242. See McUsic, supra note 48, at 330-32 (noting that educational performance "outputs"
may be auseful measurement of the adequacy of an education system, and indeed may also be more
reliable than mere measurement of funding level inputs).
243. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(c) (effective dates of approved constitutional amendments).
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whether legislative, executive or judicial.2 ' Not only legislative history,
but also information generally available to the public make clear that
Revision 6 would raise the state's duty to provide for education, that this
duty might well include additional funding and higher standards, and that
this duty would be enforceable in court. 5
The sole legislative response to Revision 6 has been the new Florida
voucher law.246 Referring specifically to the new constitutional revision
and the desire of Floridians to "provide the opportunity to obtain a high-
quality education,"2 7 the voucher law was signed by Governor Bush on
June 21, 1999. Significantly, the voucher law provides for the grading of
Florida schools based upon student and school performance data.248 Where
schools are ranked as failing, the board of education is authorized to
provide additional resources or change practices, or allow parents to send
their children to another school.249 Most controversially, the legislature also
established the Opportunity Scholarship Program, 2 0 which grants parents
of students in schools ranked as failing for two years vouchers to attend
private schools."'
244. See CRC MNUTES, supra note 158, Feb. 26, 1998, at 67 (Statement of Commissioner
Brochin); id.,Jan. 15,1998, at 300 (Statement ofCommissioner Brochin); id.,Jan. 13, 1998, at 148
(Statement of Commissioner Mills).
245. See, e.g., Robert M. Brochin, Revision 6 a Demand for Education, Not Litigation, PAuM
BEACH POST, Oct. 29, 1998, at 21A (Revision 6A mandate to provide better support for education,
and government would be accountable for its performance of that mandate); Editorial, Revision 6:
Vote YES to Boost Public Education's Performance, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 26, 1998 at 8A (Revision
6 would offer a guide to lawmakers, education officials and educators by setting standards, and
would offer a constitutional ground for legal challenges when the system fails to meet these
standards). Significantly, even those newspapers which opposed passage of Revision 6 made similar
statements as to its likely effects. See, e.g., Shirish Date, School Issue Could Cost Taxpayers
Billions, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at 8A (Revision 6 could result in "court-dictated level
of funding which would be greater than legislature had provided"); Martin Dyckman, Making
Education a State Priority, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at 17A (Revision 6 provides
standards for legislature; possibility of lawsuits, but the standards are meant to assist courts also);
Gary Fineout, Late in the Game, Amendment 6 Is Picking Up Critics, TAuAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,
Oct. 26, 1998 (Revision 6 could openly allow for lawsuits to compel more funding for education
system); Editorial, Schools and the Risks of Revision 6, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 26, 1998, at 8 (lawsuits
could force the state to spend more money on education).
246. See generally 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-398 §§ 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 229.0535) & 2.
247. Id. (creating FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(1)).
248. See id. §§ I (amending FLA. STAT. § 229.0535) & 7 (amending FLA. STAT. § 229.057).
Performance data include student achievement levels on the FCAT, as well as attendance levels,
dropout rates, school discipline data, and information on student readiness for college. See id. § 7.
249. See id. § 1.
250. See id. § 2 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 229.057).
251. See id. Two lawsuits were filed challenging theFlorida voucher program on the following
grounds: 1) the education provision, FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; 2) the public school funding clause,
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6; 3) the Florida religious establishment clause, FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; and
4) the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Holmes
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The voucher program is outside the scope of this article, but several
features of the new program are important: first, the grading of schools
implicates the state's duty under Article IX, Section 1, inasmuch that a
state declaration that schools are "failing" would seem also to be a
declaration as to the adequacy of public education in that school and the
uniformity of education offered by the system; second, vouchers may or
may not be legal, but their existence does not satisfy the state's duty to
make "adequate provision" for a "system of public schools." The state still
has a duty to ensure that the public school system is efficient, safe, secure
and high quality, and that it allows students to obtain a high quality
education. Where even the state recognizes that schools are failing, this
may be prima facie evidence that the state is not meeting that standard,
though the question still remains as to whether a few failing schools are
enough to establish a system-wide violation of Article IX, Section 1."
Vouchers may or may not be a part of any large-scale adequacy remedy, 3
but alone they do not appear sufficient to satisfy the very high duty the
citizens of Florida have imposed upon the state. After only one legislative
session, it is too soon to determine what the reaction of the Florida
Legislature will be to the newly expanded duty with regard to adequate
provision.
If it is too soon to judge the reaction of the legislature, it is even more
premature for any judicial response to Revision 6. Following Coalition for
Adequacy,"54 and the narrow division of the Florida Supreme Court on
v. Bush, Case No. CV 99-3370 (Fla. 2d Cir., filed June 22, 1999); Florida Educ. Ass'n-United,
AFT v. State Bd. of Educ., Case No. CV 99-441 (Fla. 2d Cir., filed July 29, 1999). After a hearing
on the facial validity of the voucher program under article IX, section 1, the circuit court found the
program unconstitutional. See Holmes v. Bush, Case No. CV 99-3370, slip op. at 16 (Fla. 2d Cir.,
Mar. 14,2000).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
253. See CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Mar. 17, 1998, at 238 (Statement of Commissioner
Brochin) (foreseeing the possibility that vouchers, charter schools and private schools might be a
part of an overall solution to Florida's adequacy problems). During meetings of the Education
Committee regarding Prop. 157, Commissioner Mills was asked whether this proposal would have
any impact on parental choice issues, whether charter or magnet schools, or voucher programs.
Hearings of Educ. Comm., Dec. 11, 1997 (Statement of Commissioner Mills). In committee,
Commissioner Mills answered:
I don't see this language as having any [such] effect. I would state that for the
record. Because this [proposal] relates to a definition of adequate provision, I
think it relates to the grammatical provision in the first paragraph which is a
uniform system of free public schools.... It might even enhance other public
education programs. But there is clearly no intent to circumscribe that effort.
Id.
254. See Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 400.
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whether Florida's Constitution already contained some minimal
educational adequacy requirement0 5 additional education finance
litigation was almost a certainty in Florida. The dissent in Coalition for
Adequacy as much as invited further attempts to convince a majority of the
court that the system was inadequate.216 The members of the CRC drafted
Revision 6 knowing that litigation was likely no matter what they did, and
they realized their unique ability to provide more explicit standards to
guide any future court considering the public education system.
Introducing Proposal 157, Comnmissioner Mills denied that the proposal
itself would cause litigation, but stated, 'There is going to be litigation
anyway. What this will do is provide a standard... for a court to judge." 7
The litigation began very quickly after Revision 6 was adopted, but
relied on the existing constitutional provision as well as the new one. The
first case, Honore v. Florida State Board of Education,5's was filed in the
circuit court in Leon County on January 4, 1999,"s or immediately prior
to Revision 6 coming into effect.2' Plaintiffs in this class action suit
include minority students and their parents from poor communities who
attend "inadequate" Florida schools, most of which are in communities in
which a majority of local students are either poor or from minority
groups.2 61 The Honore complaint makes two adequacy-related charges.
First, the complaint alleges that the student plaintiffs are denied an
adequate education
so as to be unreasonably at risk of functional illiteracy in all
capacities and have been denied an equal chance to achieve
the educational goals prescribed by both the Present
Constitutional Provision and the Amended Constitutional
255. See supra text accompanying notes 132-46 (discussing the Coalition forAdequacy case).
256. See Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 410 n.10 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
257. CRCMINUTES,supranote 158,Jan. 13,1998,at 150(StatementofCommissionerMills).
Exploring the specific definitions that Prop. 157 added to "adequate provision," Commissioner
Mills went on to say, "I think there will be litigation irrespective of what we do. Will it make
that-the resolution of that litigation more acceptable? Probably." Iii
258. No. CV-99-17 (Fla. 2d Circuit, filed Jan. 4, 1999).
259. See id.
260. See FLA. CoNsT. art. XI, § 5(c) (amendments approved by electors are effective "on the
first Tuesday after the first Monday in January following the election," or as otherwise provided in
the amendment). The CRC revisions were thus effectively part of the Florida Constitution on
Tuesday, January 5, 1999. See id.
261. The class action suit seeks to define the class as "all children in Florida who are, or may
in the future be, attending public elementary, middle or high schools which fail to offer a substantial
number of their students an adequate and high quality education." Honore Complaint at 21 (on
file with author). Plaintiffs also include civil rights and immigrant rights organizations. See id. at
1 14-18. Defendants include the State Board of Education, the Governor, the Commissioner of
Education, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. See id. at 28-33.
20001
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Provision. Plaintiffs have been denied the education necessary
to permit them to graduate, to enter the workplace, to compete
with their peers, and to participate as citizens.262
The complaint also appeals to the quality language of Article IX, Section
1, claiming that plaintiffs have been "denied the high quality system
affording a high quality education guaranteed by the Amended
Constitutional Provision., 263 The complaint alleges that the state has failed
to provide adequate resources, staffing, leadership, or educational
programs for schools attended by children in the Plaintiff class.
261
Relief requested includes inter alia a declaration that education is a
"fundamental right of Florida children, and that adequate education
guaranteed by [the] Florida Constitution includes ... sufficient oral and
written communication skills to enable students to function in [a] complex
society. '265 Additionally, the Honore plaintiffs seek an order compelling
the state "to establish an effective remedial plan for public education."2 
6
The nature of the named plaintiffs in Honore, coming solely from certain
disadvantaged districts, may present an incomplete and unbalanced view
of Florida's overall education needs. Their reliance on due process as a
supplement to the Education Article, as opposed to equal protection, is also
interesting. No action has been taken on this case, however, since filing in
January 1999.
Although it is impossible to predict with accuracy the outcome of this
or future cases, the language of the new constitutional provision, together
262. Honore Complaint at 9 73 (Count 1); cf. Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 409
(Overton, J., concurring) (30% illiteracy-standard for demonstrating inadequacy).
263. Honore Complaint at 1 74. Finally, in their second count, plaintiffs make a state due
process claim that an adequate education is now a "fundamental right implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty and constitutes a substantive liberty and property interest of plaintiffs. Obtaining
such an education is also a necessary predicate to the ability to exercise other fundamental rights."
Id. at 77 (Count II); cf FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law .....
264. See id. at 74.
265. Honore Complaint at 27 (request for relief).
266. Honore Complaint at 29 (request for relief). Such a plan would include:
a. Provide necessary resources, staffing, leadership, and educational
programs, to meet performance criteria to prevent functional illiteracy and
to afford a high quality education; and
b. Establish and adequately fund accountability provisions that bring
meaningful assistance to schools and classrooms that valid testing
instruments show are failing to provide students with an opportunity for
a high quality education by permitting functional illiteracy in one or more
capacity, and establish and fund responsive changes when failure persists.
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with the clear intent of the CRC, should be sufficient to overcome the
Coalition for Adequacy holding that separation of powers and political
question concerns prevent review.2 67 The intent is clear that the new
provision is judicially enforceable. The role of the court, as always, is "to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule.' 268 Though Florida courts, as the
guardians of the separation of powers,2 69 are rightly wary of interfering
with the constitutional roles of other branches of government, a
conceivable situation might arise where the courts were obliged to mandate
legislative or executive actions to fulfill a clear constitutional mandate.'70
Although the CRC did not explicitly declare education a fundamental right,
it is clear that the courts will be obliged to determine whether the state is
meeting its duty to provide for public education,27 as even under the
previous standard the right facts would have resulted in a declaration of
unconstitutionality of the education system.272 The issue becomes what
facts exist and can be proven by future plaintiffs.
267. Cf. Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 406-08; see supra text accompanying notes
132-46 (discussing the Coalition for Adequacy case).
268. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); cf THE FEDERAUST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton) ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.").
269. The Florida Constitution provides: "The powers of the state government shall be divided
into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein." FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 3.
270. Indeed, an earlier case examining Article IX, Section 1, Florida Constitution, prompted
the following observation by the Florida Supreme Court:
The judiciary is in a lofty sense the guardian of the law of the land and the
Constitution is the highest law. A constitution would be a meaningless instrument
without some responsible agency of government having authority to enforce it..
.. When the people have spoken through their organic law concerning their basic
rights, it is primarily the duty of the legislative body to provide the ways and
means of enforcing such rights; however in the absence of appropriate legislative
action, it is the responsibility of the courts to do so.
Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1972). The
plaintiffs in Coalition for Adequacy argued that Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n created
an exception to the separation of powers in the area of constitutionally guaranteed rights, but the
plurality of the court declined to find any basis for judicial intrusion into the role of the other
branches. See Coalition for Adequacy, 680 So. 2d at 407.
271. The change perhaps reinforces what may have been the case after CoalitionforAdequacy,
but may also persuade other justices that the new higher standard is justiciable. In this regard, the
change may be more apparent than real, given that four justices (the three dissenters and Justice
Overton) in Coalition forAdequacy would found adequacy issues justiciable given certain factual




In other states where courts have allowed adequacy challenges to go
forward, or have found education systems to be inadequate, explicit facts
provided evidence for these inadequacies. These states offer hints as to
what Florida courts might consider a demonstration of inadequacy. In
Leandro v. State,273 for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court
remanded an adequacy challenge to the trial court, noting several factors
that might substantiate the plaintiffs' claims that they were being denied
the right to a "sound basic education" afforded by the state constitution. 274
First, the court pointed to the "educational goals and standards adopted by
the legislature" as important but not determinative.275 Likewise, the
performance of students on various standardized tests is an important
"output" measurement.276 General levels of state per-pupil education
expenditure is also relevant. 77 These factors were not exclusive.
Failure of schools and students to meet academic standards is a factor
often pointed to by courts as evidence of educational inadequacy.278
Likewise, lack or failure of adequacy in teaching of core subjects is
significant.279 Failure to provide teaching materials is significant.2 0 Inferior
library resources is another oft-cited factor.281 Dropout rates may be
evidence of inadequacy.282 Lack of counseling and guidance services for
273. 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
274. See id. at 259.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 259-60; McUsic, supra note 48, at 332.
277. See Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 260 (citing Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439
N.E.2d 359, 369 (N.Y. 1982)). TheNorth Carolina court noted however, that even greatly increased
funding sometimes only translated into very modest performance gains. See id. (adding that the state
had increased education funding every year since 1969-70).
278. See, e.g., Opinion of the Judges No. 388, 624 So. 2d 107, 127 (Ala. 1199) (evidence of
inadequate system that some public schools failed to meet state accreditation standards due to
inadequate funding); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989);
Abbott 11, 575 A.2d at 400; DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733,743 (Ohio 1997) (also noting that
state had itself suspended routine minimum standard evaluations).
279. See, e.g., Opinion of the Judges No. 388, 624 So. 2d at 121; McDuffy v. Secretary of
Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Mass. 1993); DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 743. The New
Jersey court, in Abbott II, elaborated on these problems, criticizing a system where some districts
"offer curricula denuded not only of advanced academic courses but of virtually every subject that
ties a child.., to school-of art, music, drama, athletics, even, to a very substantial degree, of
science and social studies." Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 398.
280. See, e.g., DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 743 (noting, for example, that in some schools no
books existed for some classes, in others a "lottery" was held to award a few books to students, and
many districts used old and outdated teaching materials).
281. See, e.g., Opinion ofthe Judges No. 388,624 So. 2dat 121;McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 521;
Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 402.
282. See, e.g., Abbott 11, 575 A.2d at 401 ("A district cannot deliver a thorough and efficient
education to a dropout.").
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students contributes to a showing of inadequacy. 3 Courts may also
compare the state's education to that afforded by other states.'
It is in the area of facilities, however, that the most striking problems
occur. The inadequacies may go beyond overcrowding,2 85 or failure to
provide necessary equipment and technological resources.286 Older
buildings and plant may be in disrepair, and even in dangerous condition.
In New Jersey, the court noted instances of crumbling buildings, collapsing
floors, and an instance of a building sinking into the ground, as well as
many instances where schools required repairs of roofs, ventilation
systems, electrical systems, plumbing systems, or required asbestos
removal.8 7 In Ohio, the court noted the presence of dangerous facilities
problems: nearly all schools had asbestos problems; an elementary school
"sliding downhill at a rate of an inch per month"; coal dust in the air;
outdated sewage systems; "arsenic in the drinking water" at one elementary
school; "a dangerously warped gymnasium floor;" and no heating or the
use of kerosene heaters.3 A system with such problems would be
inadequate under Florida's new provision, perhaps for failure to be "safe."
Of course, the outcome of any litigation is not predetermined.
Plaintiffs in any case would have to persuade the court that the Florida
education system does not meet the newly defined adequacy standard. If
success in any such case is def'med as real improvement in the public
education system, this depends upon the legislature responding positively
and comprehensively to a court declaration. 8 9 Such a positive response
283. See, e.g., McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 521; Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 402. Speaking of the
failures of one plaintiff school district, the Texas Supreme Court noted that it offered no foreign
language programs, "no pre-kindergarten, no chemistry, no physics, no calculus, no college
preparatory, no honors program, virtually no extra-curricular activities like band, debate or
football." Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393.
284. See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197 (noting that Kentucky students compared poorly both
nationally and within the region).
285. See, e.g., McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 553; DeRolph, 677 N.W.2d at 743. In New Jersey, the
court noted instances of children eating lunch in the boiler room in the basement or in the hall;
remedial classes being taught in a bathroom or in storage closets. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 397. In
Texas, one-third of school districts failed to meet state standards on maximum class size at the
beginning of litigation. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393.
286. See, e.g., Opinion of the Judges No. 388,624 So. 2d at 121; Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 395-
97.
287. See Abbott 11, 575 A.2d at 397.
288. See DeRolph, 677 N.W.2d at 743-45.
289. See George D. Brown, BindingAdvisory Opinions: A Federal Court's Perspective on the
State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 544 (1994) (noting that, because of their
complexity, education finance cases are not usually resolved by court decision alone, but often by
the judiciary in a dialogue with the political branches); cf Douglas S. Reed, Court-OrderedSchool
Finance Equalization: JudicialActivism andDemocratic Opposition, in DEVELOPMENTSINSCHOOL
-NANCE, 1996, at 97, 115 (Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, NCES 97-535,1997) (noting that lasting
education reform depends on legislative and popular responses to court decisions).
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seems to have happened in Kentucky following the 1989 Rose decision,219
where the legislature immediately provided for an overhaul of the
education system in compliance with that decision.291 The situation in
Florida may be distinguished from those states where education litigation
has been most protracted, forcing courts to repeatedly invalidate
insufficient legislative responses. In states such as New Jersey,292 Texas
2 93
or New Hampshire,294 inequities between districts played a major part in
the litigation. Florida has a system generally judged more equitable than
those states .295 Furthermore, Florida courts have upheld that system under
the Florida Constitution's "uniformity" requirement.2' Thus, at the outset,
a Florida court will be able to concentrate on the adequacy of the education
system rather than on funding disparities, but there may also be equal
protection issues with very bad or failing schools as distinct from a
uniformity issue. An unequal system is inadequate.
Furthermore, the state funding structure would be important should
a court invalidate the education-finance system. Florida shares the situation
of Texas in that both states forbid a state income tax,2' while New
Hampshire has an income tax only for interest, dividends, trusts and
290. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 186.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 34-44 (discussing the outcome of the Kentucky
litigation).
292. New Jersey, with a short pause, has been involved in education-finance litigation for over
twenty-five years, reviewing the constitutionality of both initial and subsequent revised education
funding programs. See supra notes 29 & 52 (summary of New Jersey cases, Robinson v. Cahill and
Abbott v. Burke). The Rhode Island court, in City of Pawtucket v. Sandlun, pointed to the "morass"
of New Jersey litigation, and the "decades-long struggle of the Supreme Court of New Jersey that
has attempted to define what constitutes the 'thorough and efficient' education specified in that
state's constitution." 662 A.2d at 59. The Rhode Island court noted that this protracted litigation
had consumed significant financial resources, time, effort and court attention, justifying Rhode
Island's decision to avoid entering the fray. See id. ("The volume of litigation and the extent of
judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the
duties of a Legislature.").
293. See Edgewoodl, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (overtumingTexas funding systembecause
of substantial disparities among districts' ability to raise revenue); Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491
(Tex. 1991) (invalidating as insufficient attempt by legislature to address these disparities);
Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) (invalidating second attempt by legislature); and
Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995) (narrowly approving legislative funding scheme).
294. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) (finding school
finance system based entirely on varying property tax rates across the state to be unconstitutional).
295. See Reed, supra note 289, at 97 (comparing legislative and popular responses to court
involvement in Connecticut, New Jersey, Texas and Kentucky); see supra text accompanying notes
114-31 (discussing Florida's uniformity requirement).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 114-31 (discussing Florida's uniformityrequirement).
297. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 5(b) (forbidding a personal income tax, except under the
unlikely condition that the federal government offers a full credit for state income tax against
federal income tax); TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e.
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partnerships.298 New Hampshire has the additional difficulty of no state
sales tax.' Other state finance structures may make it more difficult to
address a court's invalidation of an education system, especially when
there are substantial inequities present. Under Florida's longstanding FEFP
program, the state makes a much higher contribution to public education,
a fact which contributes to the relative equity of the Florida system."° In
the end, however, any long-term solution to educational inadequacy must
depend on the legislature responding constructively to a judicial
declaration." Only this response will forestall what all parties should wish
to avoid: further and sustained judicial interference in the education
system. The example of Kentucky affords the salutary example of a
constructive legislative response that expanded funding, revised the
curriculum, mandated new testing, and introduced other reforms, effecting
real improvement in that state's education system. 2
VII. CONCLUSION
Responding to widespread concerns about the inadequacy of Florida's
public education system, and the lack of commitment of the state to fund
that system, the 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission attempted to
find an acceptable medium between two unsatisfactory alternatives: a
provision that does nothing and one that does too much. The solution,
Revision 6, is not aspirational language to be ignored as meaningless by
the legislature and unenforceable by courts. Nor did the CRC wish to use
the constitution to micro-manage every executive and legislative decision
regarding education finance. Unlike other CRC proposals and the
298. SeeN.H.REV.STAT. § 77:3(I)(a) (gross interestand diligentincomeover$2,400 taxable);
N.H. REV. STAT. § 77:10 (trust income); N.H. REV. STAT. § 77:14 (partnership income). Since the
Claremont decision, the legislature considered and rejected a general income tax in New
Hampshire. See GeetaO'Donnell Anand, New Hampshire Schools Still Face FundShortage, WALL
ST. J., July 7, 1999, at NEI.
299. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OpTHE UNITED STATES 1997, THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK
311 (117th ed. Oct. 1997) (Table 493) (New Hampshire is one of only five states without a general
sales tax). In 1995-96, local funds accounted for 87.1% of New Hampshire education spending,
with the state contributing only 7%. See 1998 DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, at 170. See
generally Macia A. Brown Thunberg, Raising Revenue for an Adequate Education in New
Hampshire, 20 VT. L. REV. 1001, 1011-20 (1996).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 101-09 (discussing the Florida Education Finance
Program).
301. See Brown, supra note 289, at 544; see also Kelly, supra note 216, at 403-33 (comparing
legislative responses to court decisions in Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Tennessee and
Texas).
302. See Quality Counts, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 22,1997, at 114-16; see supra text accompanying
notes 34-44 (describing further the Kentucky case and resulting reforms).
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unsuccessful initiative amendment in 1997,303 the CRC declined to inscribe
in stone a specific number or percentage as the minimal level of education
support. Such a course of action would have represented a marked decrease
in the discretion of the legislature. Rather, the Commission sought to make
clear the necessity for improvement to education and to set out criteria to
clarify the state's duty to make provision for public education.
The Florida Constitution Revision Commission gave the legislature
the opportunity to respond to and comply with the mandate of the revised
constitutional provision, but made clear their intention that the courts
should be able to interpret the constitution and enforce the provision if the
legislature did not.3°4 An overwhelming majority of Floridians supported
this change in their organic law. In the long years of education-finance
litigation across the United States, Florida alone has chosen to amend the
constitution to provide standards for reluctant courts and the legislature.
The challenge and duty is clear to all branches of government: to bring
about an improved educational system that is high quality. How and when
this challenge is met depends on how the legislature responds and how the
courts enforce the will of the voters as enshrined in their constitution.
303. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Requirement forAdequate Pub. Educ.
Funding, 703 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1997); see supra text accompanying notes 144-46 (discussing the
unsuccessful initiative amendment which would have fixed state education funding at 40% of state
appropriations).
304. See CRC MINUTES, supra note 158, Jan. 13, 1998, at 149-52 (Dialogue between
Commissioners Barkdull & Mills); id. at 279-80 (Statement of Commissioner Brochin).
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APPENDIX I: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
RLATIVE TO PUBLIC EDUCATION
Alabama: Category It
Amendment 111 Art. XV, § 256
It is the policy of the state of Alabama to foster and promote the
education of its citizens in a manner and extent consistent with its available
resources, and the willingness and ability of the individual student, but
nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as creating or recognizing
any right to education or training at public expense, nor as limiting the
authority and duty of the legislature, in furthering or providing for
education, to require or impose conditions or procedures deemed necessary
to the preservation of peace and order.
Alaska: Category I
Art. VII, § 1 Public Education
The legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system
of public schools open to all children of the State, and may provide for
other public educational institutions. Schools and institutions so
established shall be free from sectarian control. No money shall be paid
from public funds for the direct benefit of any religious or other private
educational institution.
Arizona: Category I
Art. XI, § 1 Public School System
The Legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school
system, which system shall include kindergarten schools, common schools,
high schools, normal schools, industrial schools, and a university (which
shall include an agricultural college, a school of mines, and such other
technical schools as may be essential, until such time as it may be deemed
advisable to establish separate State institutions of such character.) The
Legislature shall also enact such laws as shall provide for the education
t See supra text accompanying notes 60-63 (discussing the categorization of education
clauses).
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and care of the deaf, dumb, and blind.
Art. XI, § 6 Admission of Students of Both Sexes
The University and all other State educational institutions shall be
open to students of both sexes, and the instruction furnished shall be as
nearly free as possible. The Legislature shall provide for a system of
common schools by which a free school shall be established and
maintained in every school district for at least six months in each year,
which school shall be open to all pupils between the ages of six and
twenty-one years.
Arkansas: Category II
Art. XIV, § 1 Free School System
Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark
of a free and good government, the State shall ever maintain a general,
suitable, and efficient system of free public schools.
Art. XIV, § 3 School District Tax
The General Assembly shall provide for the support of common
schools by general law. In order to provide quality education, it is the goal
of this state to provide a fair system for the distribution of funds. It is
recognized that, in providing such a system, some funding variations may
be necessary. The primary reason for allowing such variations is to allow
school districts, to the extent permissible, to raise additional funds to
enhance the educational system within the school district. It is further
recognized that funding variations or restrictions thereon may be necessary
in order to comply with, or due to, other provisions of this Constitution, the
United States Constitution, state or federal laws, or court orders.
California: Category III
Art. IX, § 1 Encouragement of Education
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature
shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual,
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.
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Colorado: Category II
Art. IX, § 2 Establishment and Maintenance of Public Schools
The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free
public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state,
between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated
gratuitously. One or more public schools shall be maintained in each
school district within the state, at least three months in each year; any
school district falling to have such school shall not be entitled to receive
any portion of the school fund for that year.
Connecticut: Category I
Art. VIII, § 1 Free Public Schools
There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools
in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by
appropriate legislation.
Delaware: Category II
Art. X, § 1 Establishment and Maintenance of
Free Public Schools-Attendance
The General Assembly shall provide for the establishment and
maintenance of a general and efficient system of free public schools, and
may require by law that every child, not physically or mentally disabled,
shall attend the public school, unless educated by other means.
Florida: Category IV (Category II Prior to 1998)
Art. IX, § 1 Public Education
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the
State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make
adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient,
safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows
students to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment,
maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other
public education programs that the needs of the people may require.
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Georgia: Category IV
Art. VIII, § 1 Public Education
Paragraph I: Public education; free public education prior to college
or post-secondary level; support by taxation. The provision of an adequate
public education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State
of Georgia. Public education for the citizens prior to the college or post-
secondary level shall be free and shall be provided for by taxation. The
expense of other public education shall be provided for in such manner and
in such amount as may be provided by law.
Hawaii: Category I
Article X, § 1 Education
The State shall provide for the establishment, support and control of
a statewide system of public schools free from sectarian control, a state
university, public libraries and such other educational institutions as may
be deemed desirable, including physical facilities therefor. There shall be
no discrimination in public educational institutions because of race,
religion, sex or ancestry; nor shall public funds be appropriated for the
support or benefit of any sectarian or private educational institution, except
that proceeds of special purpose revenue bonds authorized or issued under
section 12 of Article VII may be appropriated to finance or assist
not-for-profit corporations that provide early childhood education and care
facilities serving the general public.
Idaho: Category II
Art. IX, § 1 Legislature to Establish System of Free Schools
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly
upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of
Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system
of public, free common schools.
Illinois: Category IV
Art. X, § 1 Goal-Free Schools
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational
development of all persons to the limits of their capacities. The State shall
provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational
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institutions and services. Education in public schools through the
secondary level shall be free. There maybe such other free education as the
General Assembly provides by law. The State has the primary
responsibility for financing the system of public education.
Indiana: Category III
Art. VIII, § 1 Common Schools System
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community,
being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty
of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral,
intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by
law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein
tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.
Iowa: Category III
Art. IX, § 3 Perpetual Support Fund
The general assembly shall encourage, by all suitable means, the
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.
The proceeds of all lands that have been or hereafter may be, granted by
the United States to this state, for the support of schools, which may have
been or shall hereafter be sold, or disposed of, and the five hundred
thousand acres of land granted to the new states, under an act of congress,
distributing the proceeds of the public lands among the several states of the
union, approved in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
forty-one, and all estates of deceased persons who may have died without
leaving a will or heir, and also such percent as has been or may hereafter
be granted by congress, on the sale of lands in this state, shall be, and
remain a perpetual fund, the interest of which, together with all rents of the
unsold lands, and such other means as the general assembly may provide,
shall be inviolably appropriated to the support of common schools
throughout the state.
Kansas: Category I
Art. VI, § 1 Schools and Related Institutions and Activities
The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational
and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public schools,
educational institutions and related activities which may be organized and
changed in such manner as may be provided by law.
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Kentucky: Category 11
§ 183 General Assembly to Provide for School System
The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for
an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.
Louisiana: Category I
Art. VIII, § 1 Public Education System
The legislature shall provide for the education of the people of the
state and shall establish and maintain a public educational system.
Art. VIII, § 13 (B) Minimum Foundation Program
The State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education or its
successor shall develop and adopt a formula which shall be used to
determine the cost of a minimum foundation program of education in all
public elementary and secondary schools as well as to equitably allocate
the funds to parish and city school systems.
Maine: Category IV
Art. VII, Part 1, § 1 Legislature Shall Require Towns to
Support Public Schools; Duty of Legislature
A general diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people; to promote this
important object, the Legislature is authorized, and it shall be their duty to
require, the several towns to make suitable provision, at their own expense,
for the support and maintenance of public schools; and it shall further be
their duty to encourage and suitably endow, from time to time, as the
circumstances of the people may authorize, all academies, colleges and
seminaries of learning within the State; provided, that no donation, grant
or endowment shall at any time be made by the Legislature to any literary
institution now established, or which may hereafter be established, unless,
at the time of making such endowment, the Legislature of the State shall
have the right to grant any further powers to alter, limit or restrain any of
the powers vested in any such literary institution, as shall be judged
necessary to promote the best interests thereof.
[Vol. 52
PUBUC EDUCATION: REVISION 6
Maryland: Category H
Art. VIII, § 1 General Assembly to Establish
System of Free Public Schools
The General Assembly, at its First Session after the adoption of this
Constitution, shall by Law establish throughout the State a thorough and
efficient System of Free Public Schools; and shall provide by taxation, or
otherwise, for their maintenance.
Massachusetts: Category I
Part 2, Chap. V Duty of Legislatures and
Magistrates in All Future Periods
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among
the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights
and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and
advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among the
different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and
magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the
interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them;
especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar
schools in the towns; to encourage private societies and public institutions,
rewards and immunities, for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences,
commerce, trades, manufactures, and a natural history of the country; to
countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general
benevolence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and
punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social
affections, and generous sentiments among the people.
Michigan: Category I
Part 1, Chap VIII, § 2 Free Public Elementary and
Secondary Schools; Discrimination
The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public
elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district
shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to




Art. XIII, § 1 Uniform System of Public Schools
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly
upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to
establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The legislature
shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a
thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout the state.
Mississippi: Category I
Art. VIII, § 201 Free Public Schools
The Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the establishment,
maintenance and support of free public schools upon such conditions and
limitations as the Legislature may prescribe.
Missouri: Category I
Art. IX, § l(a) Free Public Schools-Age Limit
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general
assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous
instruction of all persons in this state within ages not in excess of
twenty-one years as prescribed by law.
Montana: Category HI
Art. X Educational Goals and Duties
§ 1. It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education
which will develop the full educational potential of each person. Equality
of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state.
§ 3. The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public
elementary and secondary schools. The legislature may provide such other
educational institutions, public libraries, and educational programs as it
deems desirable. It shall fund and distribute in an equitable manner to the
school districts the state's share of the cost of the basic elementary and
secondary school system.
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Nebraska: Category I
Art. VII, § 1 Legislature; Free Instruction in
Common Schools; Provide
The Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common
schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and twenty-one
years. The Legislature may provide for the education of other persons in
educational institutions owned and controlled by the state or a political
subdivision thereof.
Nevada: Category III
Art. XI, § 2 Uniform System of Common Schools
The legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common
schools, by which a school shall be established and maintained in each
school district at least six months in every year, and any school district
which shall allow instruction of a sectarian character therein may be
deprived of its proportion of the interest of the public school fund during
such neglect or infraction, and the legislature may pass such laws as will
tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each school district
upon said public schools.
New Hampshire: Category I
Part II, Art. 83 Encouragement of Literature, etc.
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community,
being essential to the preservation of a free government; and spreading the
opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the
country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of
the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to
cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and
public schools, to encourage private and public institutions, rewards, and
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce,
trades, manufactures, and natural history of the country; to countenance
and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public
and private charity, industry and economy, honesty and punctuality,
sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous sentiments,
among the people: Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by
taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools or
institutions of any religious sect or denomination.
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New Jersey: Category II
Art. VII, § 4.1 Maintenance and Support of Schools
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of
all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.
New Mexico: Category II
Art. XII, § 1 Free Public Schools
A uniform system of free public schools sufficient for the education
of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be
established and maintained.
New York: Category I
Art. XI, § 1 Common Schools
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may
be educated.
North Carolina: Category II
Art. IX, § 1 Education Encouraged
Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged.
North Dakota: Category II
Art. VIII, § 2
The legislative assembly shall provide for a uniform system of free
public schools throughout the state, beginning with the primary and
extending through all grades up to and including schools of higher
education, except that the legislative assembly may authorize tuition, fees
and service charges to assist in the financing of public schools of higher
education.
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Ohio: Category HI
Art. VI, § 2 Public School System to Be Adequately Funded
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will
secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the
State; but, no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive
right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.
Oklahoma: Category I
Art. I, § 5 Public Schools
Provisions shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of
a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the
state and free from sectarian control; and said schools shall always be
conducted in English: Provided, that nothing herein shall preclude the
teaching of other languages in said public schools.
Art. XI, § 1 Establishment and Maintenance of Public Schools
The Legislature shall establish and maintain a system of free public
schools wherein all the children of the State may be educated.
Oregon: Category H
Art. VIII, § 3 System of Common Schools
The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for the establishment
of a uniform, and general system of Common schools.
Pennsylvania: Category H
Art. HI B. § 14 Public School System
The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs
of the Commonwealth.
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Rhode Island: Category III
Art. XII, § 1 Duty of General Assembly to
Promote Schools and Libraries
The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue among the people,
being essential to the preservation of their rights and liberties, it shall be
the duty of the general assembly to promote public schools and public
libraries, and to adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper
to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education and
public library services.
South Carolina: Category I
Art. XI, § 3 System of Free Public Schools and
Other Public Institutions of Learning
The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State and shall
establish, organize and support such other public institutions of learning,
as may be desirable.
South Dakota: Category III
Art. VIII, § 1 Uniform System of Free Public Schools
The stability of a republican form of government depending on the
morality and intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature to establish and maintain a general and uniform system of
public schools wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open
to all; and to adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the
advantages and opportunities of education.
Tennessee: Category I
Art. XI, § 12 Education's Inherent Value-Public
Schools-Support of Higher Education
The State of Tennessee recognizes the inherent value of education
and encourages its support. The General Assembly shall provide for the
maintenance, support and eligibility standards of a system of free public
schools. The General Assembly may establish and support such post-
secondary educational institutions, including public institutions of higher
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learning, as it determines.
Texas: Category II
Art. VIL § 1 Support and Maintenance of
System of Public Free Schools
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation
of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the
support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.
Utah: Category II
Art. X, § 1 Free Nonsectarian Schools
The Legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance
of the state's education systems including: (a) a public education system,
which shall be open to all children of the state; and (b) a higher education
system. Both systems shall be free from sectarian control.
Vermont: Category I
Chap. II, § 68 Laws to Encourage Virtue and Prevent
Vice; Schools; Religious Activities
Laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and
immorality ought to be constantly kept in force, and duly executed; and a
competent number of schools ought to be maintained in each town unless
the general assembly permits other provisions for the convenient
instruction of youth. All religious societies, or bodies of people that may
be united or incorporated for the advancement of religion and learning, or
for other pious and charitable purposes, shall be encouraged and protected
in the enjoyment of the privileges, immunities, and estates, which they in
justice ought to enjoy, under such regulations as the general assembly of
this state shall direct.
Virginia: Category II
Art. VIII, § 1 Public Schools of High Quality to Be Maintained
The General Assembly shall provide for a system of free public
elementary and secondary schools for all children of school age throughout
the Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an educational program
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of high quality is established and continually maintained.
Washington: Category IV
Art. IX, § 1 Preamble
It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the
education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or
preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.
West Virginia: Category II
Art. XHI, § 1 Education
The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and
efficient system of free schools.
Wisconsin: Category II
Art. X, § 3 District Schools; Tuition; Sectarian
Instruction; Released Time
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district
schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools
shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages
of four and twenty years; and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed
therein; but the legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious
instruction outside the district schools, authorize the release of students
during regular school hours.
Wyoming: Category II
Art. L § 23 Education
The right of the citizens to opportunities for education should have
practical recognition. The legislature shall suitably encourage means and
agencies calculated to advance the sciences and liberal arts.
Art. VII, § 1 Legislature to Provide for Public Schools
The legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance
of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free
elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a university with such
technical and professional departments as the public good may require and
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the means of the state allow, and such other institutions as may be
necessary.
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APPENDIX II: BRIEF SUMMARY OF STATE
EDUCATION LITIGATIONt
A. States Where Education System Was Struck as Inequitable,
Inadequate, or Otherwise Unconstitutional
Alabama: Category I
Opinion of the Judges Number 388, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993),
holding that legislature must comply with circuit court order in Alabama
Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, CV-90-883-R, invalidating education
funding system, and requiring provision of substantially equitable and
adequate educational opportunities.
Arizona: Category I
Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997), appeal after remand of
Roosevelt, infra, holding that system was still inequitable, because it
allowed for substantial facility disparity.
Roosevelt Elementary School District Number 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d
806 (Ariz. 1994), invalidating education funding system as inequitable
under the education provision of the state constitution.
Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973), holding that
inequities in the state education system violated federal equal protection
clause, as well as state education provision.
Arkansas: Category II
Tucker v. Lake View School District Number 25 of Phillips County,
917 S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 1996), holding that system was inequitable, in
violation of state and federal equal protection clauses.
DuPree v. Alma SchoolDistrict Number 30 of Crawford County, 651
S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983), holding that disparities in funding system violated
both education provision and equal protection.
California: Category III
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) [Serrano 1], holding that
system was inequitable, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
t For more information on state litigation, including summaries of education finance cases
filed in 1999, see, e.g., Terry N. Whitney, State School Finance Litigation: 1999 Summary and
Analysis, NCSL ST. LEc. REP. 1-19 (Dec. 1999).
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Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) [Serrano II], cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977), holding that funding system violated state equal
protection provision by conditioning availability of school revenues on
district wealth and district expenditures.
Connecticut: Category I
Sheff v. O'Neil, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996), holding that system
was inequitable and violated both state equal protection and education
provisions, noting the existence of racial and ethnic isolation in public
schools as important factor in this decision.
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977), holding that system
was inequitable, in violation of the state equal protection clause.
Kentucky: Category II
Rose v. Councilfor Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989),
holding that education system was inadequate under state education
provision, but that order would be stayed to allow Legislature opportunity
to act.
Massachusetts: Category I
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education, 615
N.E.2d 516, holding that system was inadequate under state education
provision, on evidence that less wealthy districts suffered in educational
opportunity.
Michigan: Category I
Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973) [Milliken 1I], on
rehearing after Rodriguez, vacating Milliken I, and holding that system was
inequitable, in violation of state equal protection clause.
Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972) [Milliken 1], pre-
Rodriguez decision, holding education system violated federal equal
protection clause.
Missouri: Category I
Committee for Educational Equality v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446 (Mo.
1994), reviewed a trial court holding that education funding system was
inequitable under state education and equal protection provisions, but
dismissed appeal because the trial court judgment was not final. See infra




Helena Elementary School District Number] v. State, 784 P.2d 412
(Mont. 1990), holding that system was inequitable under state education
provision, on grounds of disparity in educational opportunities.
New Hampshire: Category I
Claremont School District v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997),
holding that system was inequitable under state education provision, on
grounds of disparity in educational funding and resources.
New Jersey: Category II
Abbot v. Burke, 575 A.2d 350 (N.J. 1990) [Abbott 11], holding that
system was inequitable and inadequate, in that funding system must be
sufficient to provide for the educational needs of the poorer districts. On
two subsequent occasions, the New Jersey Supreme Court has rejected
legislative reforms as insufficient to address the inadequacies of the
education system. See Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) [Abbott
III]; Abbot v. Burke, 639 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) [Abbott V].
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1972) [Robinson 1], cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), holding that system was inequitable, on
grounds of disparities in funding.
North Dakota: Category If
Bismarck Public School District v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D.
1994), holding system inequitable under state equal protection provision,
but unable to order remedy due to lack of statutorily-mandated quorum of
Justices.
Ohio: Category II
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997), holding that system
was inadequate, on grounds that disparities in funding and educational
opportunities violated "thorough and efficient" clause of state education
provision.
South Carolina: Category II
Abbeville County School District v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C.
1999), holding that education system was inadequate, on grounds that it
did not provide minimal educational opportunities.
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Texas: Category II
Edgewood v . Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) [Edgewood 1],
holding that system was inequitable, in that funding allowed wide
disparities in educational opportunity. The Texas Court twice struck down
as insufficient (Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491
(Tex. 1991) [Edgewood II ] & Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent
SchoolDistrict v. Edgewood Independent School District, 826 S.W.2d 489
(Tex.1992) [Edgewood III] (striking down the second attempt because it
improperly levied taxes, not on education adequacy grounds)). Only on the
third attempt, did Texas courts uphold the education finance system against
further constitutional attacks. See Edgewood Independent School District
v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995) (EdgewoodlV].
Vermont: Category I
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997), holding that system was
inequitable because lack of substantially equal educational opportunities
violated education and equal protection provisions of state constitution.
Washington: Category IV
Seattle School District Number 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978),
holding that system was inadequate under education provision of state
constitution because legislature failed to meet its "paramount duty" to fully
fund system.
West Virginia: Category I
Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W.Va. 1984), holding that
inadequate system violated state education clause.
Wyoming: Category 1I
Campbell County School District v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo.
1995), invalidating system as inadequate based on state education clause.
Washakie County School District Number 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d
310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980), holding that system was
inequitable on grounds of disparity in revenue between districts in
violation of state equal protection clause.
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
B. States Where Education System Was Upheld
(Cases marked with ** where court refused to
address the issue on the merits, e.g.,
for separation of powers reasons.)
Alaska: Category I
Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District v. State, 931 P.2d 391
(Alaska 1997), upholding system as equitable, rejecting a claim that it
violated state equal protection.
Colorado: Category II
Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo.
1982), reversing a trial court holding that system was inequitable, in
violation of state equal protection and education provisions, and noting that
constitution permitted some disparities in wealth among districts.
Florida: Category If (subsequently amended
to Category IV provision)
**Coalitionfor Adequacy & Fairness in School Funding v. Chiles,
680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996), refraining from adjudication on grounds of
separation of powers, though majority of court found issue could be
justiciable under certain circumstances.
Georgia: Category IV
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 421 (Ga. 1981), upholding
education system as adequate and rejecting a claim that system violated
equal protection.
Idaho: Category II
Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d
913 (Idaho 1998), upholding dismissal of adequacy claim based on state
education provision.
Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975), holding that state
funding system does not violate state uniformity provision.
Illinois: Category IV
**Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999), holding that
students have no cause of action under the state constitution based on the
allegation that the state has not provided a minimally adequate education.
**Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602 (Ill.
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1996), refraining from adjudication on grounds of separation of powers.
Kansas: Category I
Unified School District Number 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan.
1994), upholding education system against equity challenge based on state
education provision and state equal protection.
Louisiana: Category I
Charlet v. State, 713 So.2d 1199 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 730
So.2d 934 (La. 1998), reh'g denied, 734 So.2d 1221 (La. 1999), upholding
state school funding system against an adequacy and equity challenge
based on the state education provision.
Maine: Category IV
SchoolAdministrative DistrictNumber 1 v. Commissioner, 659 A.2d
854 (Me. 1995), upholding education funding laws against a state equal
protection challenge.
Maryland: Category RI
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 458 A.2d 758
(Md. 1983), upholding system as equitable under state education provision.
Michigan: Category I
East Jackson Public Schools v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984), holding that education is not a fundamental right under state
constitution, and that state's obligation to provide a system of free public
education is not synonymous with an obligation to provide equal per
student funding between districts.
Minnesota: Category II
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993), holding that disparities
in state finance system did not violate state education provision.
Missouri: Category I
Committee for Educational Equality v. State, 967 S.W.2d 62 (Mo.
1998), affirming trial courtjudgment upholding education funding system,
modified by legislature since 1994 decision, supra, as meeting adequacy
requirements of state education provision.
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Nebraska: Category I
Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993), upholding summary
judgment dismissing claim that funding system violated state education
and equal protection provisions where petition failed to allege that funding
deficiencies harmed education quality.
New York: Category I
Reform Education Financing Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d
647 (N.Y. 1995), holding that system of funding violated neither education
provision, nor state or federal equal protection clauses.
Board of Education, Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y.
1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983), holding that the
educational funding system did not violate education provision, and did not
violate equal protection.
North Carolina: Category HI
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997), rejecting an equality
claim under state education clause, but allowing separate adequacy claim
to proceed to trial.
Oklahoma: Category I
Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma v. State, 746 P.2d 1135
(Okla. 1997), holding system equitable absent any showing of inadequate
public education.
Ohio: Category II
Board of Education of the City School District of Cincinnati v.
Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1979), upheld
Ohio's education funding system against an equity challenge, holding that
the legislature has wide discretion, but that a minimum level did exist.
Oregon: Category II
Withers v. State, 891 P.2d 675 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), holding that
disparities in distribution of funding and opportunities did not violate
requirement of education provision.
Coalition for Equitable School Funding, Inc. v. State, 822 P.2d 116
(Or. 1991), holding that state education funding scheme did not violate
state constitution.
Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976), upholding system as
equitable under state education provision.
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Pennsylvania: Category II
**Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998),
refraining from adjudicating the adequacy of the system on grounds of
separation of powers.
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979), holding that
constitutional sections that provided for a thorough and efficient system
did not guarantee identical education programs, and upholding education
system.
Rhode Island: Category III
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995), holding that
state funding scheme for public education violated neither education nor
equal protection clauses of the state constitution, and noting that courts
should give great deference to legislature in this area.
South Carolina: Category I
Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988), holding
that public school funding system violated neither state equality guarantee
nor education provision.
Virginia: Category II
Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994), upholding
system as equitable under education provisions of state constitution, which
did not mandate substantive equality in funding.
Wisconsin: Category II
Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989), upholding system as
equitable under state "uniformity" clause, and under state equal protection
clause.

